When do Voters Endorse Violent Politicians?
A Vignette Experiment in Kenya

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Abstract

Electoral violence has become a persistent feature of elections in many of today's democratizing regimes. An emerging literature explains this phenomenon from the perspective of elites: electoral violence is a strategy for incumbents who are either unsure of their support or facing increasingly competitive challengers. But do voters find these strategies palatable, and, if so, why? Under what conditions might voters sanction politicians who use violence in order to win office? To examine these questions, we use a vignette experiment embedded in a nationally representative survey in Kenya, where violence and large-scale displacement have been common during elections since 1992. This vignette experiment allows us to assess how individuals weigh reported use of violence by candidates against a candidate's ethnicity and his expected performance in office. We find that individuals sanction politicians who are rumored to have used violence in past elections, regardless of the candidate's ethnicity partisan affiliation, or good record in office. However, the strength of this effect is not consistent across voters. Respondents who were directly affected by past electoral violence, those living in poverty and in ethnically polarized areas are more likely to accept a "trade-off" by voting for violent yet well-performing candidates. The paper also finds that the use of violence has differential effects on voter turnout. Overall, the paper suggests that political clientelism and habituation to violence lessen voters' commitment to democratic norms, such as resistance to the use of violence.

Keywords: Experimental Vignette; Electoral Violence; Corruption; Ethnicity; Kenya

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Since the early 1990s, the majority of countries in Sub-Saharan Africa have instituted multiparty elections, but many of these countries are still falling short of the standards expected of full liberal democracy. In addition to restricted civil liberties and constraints on political competition, a subset of these "hybrid regimes" have experienced episodic political violence. In some cases, political violence is primarily a strategy by which embattled incumbents retain power, and the violence remains under the control of the ruling party. In others, as in Kenya, violence is used by incumbent and opposition politicians alike. A burgeoning quantitative literature has analyzed the strategic or top-down qualities of this violence (Arriola and Johnson 2013; Hafner-Burton et al. 2014; Gutiérrez-Romero 2014). The focus has been on answering when and why political elites will *choose to use* violence, sidestepping the also important question of whether it is effective in shaping individual vote choice. Though there is little attention to the precise mechanisms by which violence yields electoral success, the presumption is that a politician's use of violence dissuades opposition voters, while having a neutral or positive effect on the votes and the turnout of his core constituents (e.g., Collier and Vicente 2012).[1]

The 2013 election in Kenya seems to support the presumption that politicians suffer few electoral costs to using violence when it comes to their own core constituencies. Both current President Uhuru Kenyatta and current Deputy President William Ruto were elected in 2013 even though both politicians were under indictment by the International Criminal Court (ICC) for their alleged involvement in the planning and execution of electoral and post-electoral violence in 2007-2008.[2] The ICC was a major issue during the election campaign, and both Kenyatta and Ruto appealed to their ethnic constituencies, arguing that they were being unjustly punished for "protecting" their own communities (Lynch 2014). Both were elected to office with the overwhelming support of their co-ethnics. Did Kenyatta and Ruto voters simply not believe the ICC allegations? Or were they balancing their disapproval of violence against their expectation of what Kenyatta and Ruto would "deliver" in terms of

[1] Political violence may primarily shift voting results by displacing or dampening the turnout of likely opposition voters. Even in these cases, however, violent politicians still rely on the votes of their own constituents: if these voters decided to sanction violence by abstaining or changing their votes, political violence would lose its efficacy. In other cases, violence is not as clearly associated with "swing" or divided constituencies (LeBas 2006), and the risk of backlash from presumably loyal voters may be higher. In all cases, there is a need to better understand how individuals perceive and process reports of violence by politicians.

[2] The ICC dropped the charges against Kenyatta in December 2014, several months after he got elected, for lack of evidence to indict him. William Ruto continues to be on trial at the ICC.

performance? We would expect the use of political violence to be potentially costly, since the majority of Africans express commitment to democratic norms and view political violence as an unacceptable practice. According to the third round of the Afrobarometer, the region's major public opinion instrument, roughly 77 percent of those surveyed (in 18 countries) agree or strongly agree that political violence is never justified.[3] Rejection of violence is highest in those countries where violence is not a regular part of elections – reaching 85 percent in Ghana and 90 percent in Benin – but substantial majorities still reject violence in countries where civil liberties and peaceful elections are less well institutionalized. In Kenya, for instance, the site of our study, 76 percent of respondents say that violence is never justified.

This paper uses a survey-embedded experiment to examine a number of propositions that have often been asserted -yet rarely tested- in the literature on electoral violence. First, under what conditions do voters choose to sanction (i.e., vote against) politicians who use violence? Secondly, to what extent are voters' decisions driven by the ethnicity or the expected performance of politicians who are rumored to use violence? Hence our interest is to test whether voters "forgive" politicians when using violence whenever they belong to their ethnic origin, or whether voters are willing to tolerate the use of violence coming from politicians who are perceived as high-performing in office. The coexistence in Kenya of a high of electoral violence, substantial ethnic voting, and high levels of expressed opposition to violence make it a particularly appropriate setting in which to examine how voters "trade off" allegations of voting against other informational cues. Another issue we explore in this article is whether politician's use of violence dampen electoral turnout of opponents, as often asserted in the literature.

To explore our research questions we rely on an experimental vignette, designed to approximate the choices that voters often make in elections in democratizing hybrid regimes. In these regimes though most voters reject the use of political violence in the abstract, they weigh reports of violence against a range of other informational cues when evaluating a candidate. These might include the candidate's ethnicity, his partisan affiliation, and his expected performance when in office. Furthermore, individuals do

[3] In the third round of the Afrobarometer, which was conducted in 2005-2006, respondents were asked which of the following two statements best reflected their view on violence: "the use of violence is never justified in [country's] politics" or "in this country, it is sometimes necessary to use violence in support of a just cause." Once respondents chose the statement they preferred, they were probed for the strength of their agreement, yielding a 4-point scale (strongly agree with A; agree with A; agree with B; strongly agree with B) as well as the possible volunteered response of non-agreement with either statement.

not merely choose candidates, but they also choose whether to continue to engage in voting or to abstain from voting altogether. The sequential nature of our survey experiment, allows us to examine the effects of different informational cues on respondents' selection of candidates and on their willingness to vote. Specifically, in the first stage of our experiment, we present voters with a choice between two candidates, only providing information on the candidate's ethnicity and party affiliation, as these conditions are strongly linked in Kenya. To empirically test whether expectations about the candidate's performance counterbalance rumors of violence, in the second stage of the experiment we provide voters with different cues about the candidates' past record regarding the use of violence and performance in office. We conclude our experiment by providing an additional cue suggesting that the respondent's preferred candidate was corrupt.

Throughout the paper, we separately examine the reactions of individuals who share a common ethnicity with politicians as well as those of respondents who belong to other ethnic groups that are in a partisan alliance with particular politicians. This empirical approach is well-suited to a context like Kenya, where parties tend to be alliances of multiple ethnic groups and where ethnicity strongly predicts vote choice (Bratton and Kimenyi 2008; Gibson and Long 2009).

There are a number of major findings in this paper. First, most individuals sanction the use of violence, regardless of the politician's ethnicity or his past performance in office. This is despite ethnicity's role as a strong predictor of our respondents' baseline vote choices when they do not receive either violence or performance cues. However, we find important differences in voting behavior according to respondents' characteristics. Poor respondents, those who live in ethnically polarized districts, and victims of past electoral violence are much less likely to sanction a candidate of the same ethnicity whenever they receive information that he had used violence in the past. Notably, political sophistication – which we would expect to diminish reliance on heuristics and boost intolerance of political violence – has little effect on respondents' behavior in our survey. Those who are more educated or politically engaged are no more likely to sanction violent politicians than their less "sophisticated" counterparts. Thirdly, additional evidence of corruption does little to affect respondent's prior vote choices. In other words, once an individual has chosen to either endorse or sanction a particular politician, receiving additional information that suggests possible candidate corruption does not trigger movement away from their prior

vote choice. Finally, we find that receiving information about a candidate's use of violence has no effect on turnout amongst their co-ethnic voters, but it does drive down turnout among those who are ethnic allies but not co-ethnics.

Overall, the most important finding of the paper is that violence is sanctioned by politicians' core ethnic constituencies and ethnic "allies" that make up important parts of political coalitions in Kenya. Despite this good news, a substantial percentage of the population (those living in poverty, residents of highly ethnically polarized areas, and victims of violence) support violence politicians when they have good records in office, thus accepting a "trade off" between violence and potential delivery of clientelistic or public goods. Moreover, our experimental findings suggest that politicians can effectively use violence to reduce turnout of rival's ethnic allies.

Candidate Evaluation

We derive four testable hypotheses that may guide voters' reactions to violent politicians: identity-based heuristics, such as ethnicity or partisanship; candidate quality (i.e., expected future performance); voters' own past exposure to violence; and political sophistication.

Copartisanship & Co-ethnicity. A substantial literature argues that voters rely on easily observed heuristics – ranging from gender, race to party labels – in order to make choices (Brady and Sniderman 1985; Popkin 1991; Ferree 2011). These are best viewed as experience-based shortcuts that allow individuals to lessen the time or cognitive energy they devote to gathering information before making decisions (e.g., Democrats tend to support policies I support, so I will vote for this Democrat; women tend to be incompetent, so I will not vote for this woman). These informal rules of thumb are presumed to be even more powerful in low-information contexts, as in Sub-Saharan Africa, where voters have few sources of information about candidate quality (Chandra 2004; Posner 2005). In the African context, voting often – but not always– follows ethnic lines (Mozaffar, Scarritt and Galaich 2003), and this association is particularly pronounced in Kenya (Bratton and Kimenyi 2008; Gibson and Long 2009; Dercon and Gutiérrez-Romero 2012). Voters may choose co-ethnic candidates for a variety of reasons – affective loyalty, rational expectation of clientelistic benefits – but voter reliance on ethnicity is also due to the weakness of partisan identity as a marker of quality or policy preferences. Across the African continent, parties are very weak and are not generally associated with programmatic orientations or with the representation

of particular cross-ethnic concerns or preferences (Van de Walle 2003). In Kenya, where programmaticity is almost entirely absent and where party labels are evanescent, partisan affiliation matters to the degree that it indicates the ethnic content of the alliance that formed the party. To a great degree, partisan and ethnic cues overlap in Kenya.[4]

To be explicit about our expectations, individuals who share an ethnic or partisan identity with a politician will be more likely to vote for that candidate. A report of violence operates like other negative information, such as corruption or incompetence. These signals lower a voter's approval of or likelihood of voting for the candidate, but this decline will less steep for candidates with whom the voter shares partisanship or ethnicity (see also LeBas 2010). Thus, candidates who lack favorable identity markers will be judged more harshly for violations of democratic norms than those who possess such markers.

Candidate performance. Reliance on ethnicity, partisanship, or other heuristics is a means of coping with poor information about the expected benefit of voting for a particular candidate. Heuristics are presumed to be associated – though unreliably – with the expected benefit of one's candidate winning office. Thus, as the standard literature on ethnicity and clientelism suggests, voters view shared ethnicity through a material rather than an affective lens: a co-ethnic politician is more likely to deliver patronage resources to his own community, thus a vote for co-ethnicity is a vote for higher expected future benefits. Clientelistic returns do not, however, accrue to all members of a community (Keefer 2007), and incompetent or venal candidates may bring very little in the way of returns for their communities. When voters receive better information about likely candidate performance, they will be less likely to privilege ethnicity or other less reliable indicators of expected benefit. When choosing between candidates, information about performance may affect vote choice in two ways. Reports of competence or good past performance by an opposing politician may provide an incentive for voters to abandon a violent politician of their own ethnic or partisan groups. Alternatively, if faced with a violent politician who is also a good performer, candidates may weigh the latter informational signal over the former. Winters and

[4] This is part of the reason that we do not prime partisanship and ethnicity separately in our vignette design. Separate priming would have inflated our number of treatments, making interpretation difficult given our sample size, and joint priming more accurately represents the context in Kenya (i.e., a Luo would rarely run on the TNA ticket; a Kikuyu would rarely run on the ODM ticket – and should candidates of this type run, they would likely be viewed as less likely to be elected by our respondents).

Weitz-Shapiro (2013) frame this as the "trade-off hypothesis" in their research on how voters assess corrupt politicians: voters tolerate corrupt politicians if those politicians "deliver" in terms of public goods or other benefits when they gain office. We might envision a similar logic at work with those politicians who are rumored to use violence.

Habituation to political violence. Though we believe that experience of violence is likely to have significant effects on how voters perceive violent politicians, the existing literature does not offer clear predictions about the direction of this effect. On the one hand, individuals who are exposed to political violence may become habituated to its use. Thus, those with higher levels of exposure to violence or other violations of democratic norms may come to see these violations as "normal politics." Using a panel survey that spanned the disputed 2007 elections in Kenya, Gutiérrez-Romero (2014) finds that the direct victims of the electoral violence, as well as those living in districts that experienced violence, were more likely to believe that violence was acceptable in support of a just cause. It may be that those individuals who believe violence is justifiable would also be more likely to vote for a politician who is rumored to have used violence. On the other hand, exposure to violence or victimization might follow the path proposed in LeBas (2010). In a survey-embedded experiment conducted in Kibera, the largest slum in Kenya, she finds that those who bear the brunt of violence and elite manipulation are more likely to sanction politicians who use violence and less likely to discriminate in favor of their own co-ethnics.

Political sophistication. The powerful effects of identity-based cues tend to dissipate when voters have access to higher-quality information or have greater political background knowledge (Arceneaux 2008; Kam 2005; Conroy-Krutz 2012).[5] For instance, in a vignette experiment in Spain, Anduiza Gallega and Munoz (2013) found that respondents judged corrupt politicians less harshly when they shared a partisan identity with those politicians. This effect, however, disappeared at higher levels of political awareness.

Thus, the collection of attributes that are generally termed "political sophistication" lessens the power of partisanship or other identity markers in determining how individuals process new information about politicians. Political sophistication may emerge through the process of political discussion and engagement, a mechanism consistent with the political science literature on the positive effects of

[5] See also, for instance, the research that suggests that low-information voters are more likely to be swayed by ballot design (Krutz and Moehler 2013).

political discussion and deliberation on tolerance for dissenting views (Mutz 2006) and support for democracy (Gibson 2001). Political sophistication may also be produced by living in more diverse or more cosmopolitan environments. Research conducted in Africa has tended to support the contact hypothesis developed by scholars of race relations in the United States: residence in ethnically diverse areas is associated with diminished bias and discrimination against ethnic "others." Thus, Kasara (2013) finds that those living in diverse areas of Kenya are more trusting of members of other ethnic groups, while Robinson (2013) finds an association between local-level ethnic diversity and higher levels of intergroup trust across 16 African countries.

This leads to two separate expectations regarding political sophistication and individuals' assessment of violent politicians. First, those who are more politically informed or interested will be more likely to uniformly sanction violent politicians, or they will be less likely to discount violence when performed by their own co-ethnic. Secondly, those living in more diverse areas – who presumably have greater contact with members of other ethnic groups – will also be less likely to discriminate on ethnic grounds when evaluating violent politicians.

Research Setting

Kenya is an especially good context in which to assess the competing demands of ethnicity and attachment to democratic norms. Violence is a highly salient political issue in the country. Even prior to the 2008 post-election violence, tens of thousands of Kenyans had been displaced by political violence in Rift Valley and on the Coast in the 1990s. In the 1990s, violence was largely under the control of the ruling party, and those perceived to be opposition supporters were targeted and forcibly displaced, especially in the Rift Valley. This had the effect of dampening opposition voting and making opposition coordination more difficult, allowing the ruling party to hold onto power with small pluralities of the vote. By the 2000s, however, low-level violence had become a more general feature of elections, and politicians of all parties became associated with violence, intimidation, vote-buying, and other irregularities. Following the close and disputed elections of December 2007, political violence claimed the lives of over one thousands and displaced several tens of thousand more. In light of substantial evidence that both electoral and post-election violence was organized and subsidized by politicians, the International Criminal Court (ICC) issued several indictments. Among those indicted were highly visible national politicians, including

Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto. At the time, Kenyatta and Ruto belonged to opposing political alliances.[6] They subsequently formed an alliance and ran on the same ticket in the 2013 general elections.

Despite facing ongoing charges at the ICC, both current President Uhuru Kenyatta and current Deputy President William Ruto were elected in 2013 with the votes of substantial majorities of their respective ethnic constituencies. Kenyan politicians also continued intimidating voters and using gangs even during the 2013 campaign, though not at the same levels as in the 2007 campaigns (Human Rights Watch 2013, p.1). The 2013 election campaign well illustrates the kind of conflicting pressures that voters face: politicians have continued relying on illegal electoral practices, including violence and intimidation, but these politicians offer voters other goods they might value. Those accused for previous instances of electoral violence, Kenyatta and Ruto, managed to reframe their ICC indictments as punishment for the "crime" of defending their own communities (Lynch 2014). As Lynch points out, this "politics of persuasion" was highly effective, but it reinforced ethnicity as a major cleavage in Kenya. In addition to possible group defense, voters also take into account the private benefits they might receive in direct exchange for their votes, since vote-buying is common in Kenya (Kramon 2011), and also the clientelistic rewards and public goods they might receive if their favored candidate is elected (Kramon & Posner 2013). By incorporating ethnic, candidate performance, and corruption cues, our research design attempts to reflect the conflicting pressures that voters are likely to face when making real electoral choices.

Research Design

Our vignette experiment is embedded in a nationally representative survey administered to 1,207 respondents in 77 of Kenya's 210 parliamentary constituencies,[7] including all eight provinces in Kenya. The survey was conducted between 17 and 23 of December 2013, and the majority of interviews were in English (45%) or in Swahili (41%). The main characteristics of the respondents are shown in Table A.1 in Appendix A. The sample is balanced between male (53%) and female respondents (47%), and both the

[6] Ruto was a former ally of Raila Odinga in the previous election, thus, his switching of alliance in favor of Kenyata weakened the support of the Kalenjins for Odinga who had voted for him in 2007.
[7] The number of these constituencies corresponds to the administration boundaries available in 2008.

national ethnic distribution and urban/rural split of the sample resembles that of the Kenyan census.

Table 1 reports the self-reported voting choices of our respondents in the previous three presidential elections of 2002, 2007 and 2013. In the 2002 elections, Mwai Kibaki peacefully defeated Uhuru Kenyatta by a large margin according to official results, and this margin of victory is fully reflected in our survey. For that particular election, we observe no correlation between respondent's ethnicity and the Presidential candidate they (allegedly) voted for in the 2002 elections. This can be explained by the fact that both Presidential candidates were of Kikuyu origin and that Kibaki was backed up by a multi-ethnic coalition, the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC). However, the splintering of parties across ethnic lines in the 2007 and again in the 2013 presidential elections explains the strong correlations we find between respondent's ethnicity and their stated voting choices in subsequent elections.[8]

Though vote choice is strongly correlated with ethnicity, our respondents overwhelmingly reject the notion that ethnicity guides their voting decisions when asked about the factors driving their candidate selection. Less than 2 percent of our sample stated that ethnicity was the primary factor that influenced their presidential and MP votes in the 2013 elections. Instead, the majority of respondents say that they rely on more performance-oriented information when making their choice (Figure 1). When asked for the primary reason that they did not vote for the rival candidate, respondents again provided "appropriate" or what might be seen as socially desirable responses (Figure 2). A respondent's less preferred candidate was, therefore, likely to be described as corrupt, inexperienced, violent, etc. In the case of Uhuru Kenyatta, many respondents said that his ICC indictment was likely to interfere with his ability to rule. Ethnicity was not mentioned, save with the reference to "tribalism" by only 8 percent of respondents – and, even then, preference for co-ethnics was formulated as a negative quality. These are not surprising responses, and they say little about the actual reliance of voters on ethnicity when making decisions. Indeed, heuristics are used partly because they are viewed as somewhat reliable proxies for other qualities that are desired rather than because voters value the cue on its own. This leads Kenyans to hold markedly different

[8] In the 2007 elections Kibaki was backed up by a newly formed political party, the Party of National Unity (PNU), as the NARC coalition broke down in Kibaki's mid-term. PNU was perceived to be aligned on ethnic grounds (mainly in favor of the Kikuyu and Meru) as Uhuru Kenyata's party KANU, also backed up the re-election of Kibaki. Odinga was also backed up by a newly formed party, the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM), which was also perceived to be aligned on ethnic grounds (mainly in favor of Luo, Luhya and Kalenjin).

beliefs about, for instance, President Kenyatta's ICC case. 42 percent of our sample believe that Kenyatta was responsible for the alleged crime of orchestrating violence in 2007 (versus 37 percent who believe he was not responsible), but response patterns differ markedly across ethnic groups. The majority of Kenyatta's Kikuyu co-ethnics (74%) believe he was not responsible for the violence, while substantial majorities of Luo and Luhya respondents (rival Raila Odinga's core constituencies) believe that Kenyatta was responsible (Figure 3).

Respondents expressed complicated views about political violence. As mentioned earlier, a large majority –76 percent– believe that political violence is "never justified." Yet, nearly a quarter of our survey respondents believe that politicians must intimidate their opponents and hire gangs if they want to win elections (Figure A.1). Further, our survey results suggest that rumors of the use of violence are often discounted. A majority of respondents (55%) believe that rivals spread rumors about candidates' use of violence in order to divide the electorate (Figure A.2). There is therefore disagreement about the possible utility of violence and the reliability of information about candidates' use of violence. These factors may explain why evidence of involvement with political violence has done little to harm the careers of national politicians.

Experimental Vignettes

As in other vignette designs, our experiment asked respondents to respond to a hypothetical situation. In this case, respondents were asked to imagine there was a Member of Parliament vacancy in their own constituency, and two candidates were to contest the seat.[9] In order to ensure that candidates were viewed as equally competent and equally experienced, the script stated that both had been elected MPs in 2008-2013 in other constituencies similar to the respondent's home. This was plausible, as there had been a redrawing of constituencies in 2013, and we explained that this redrawing was why neither hypothetical candidate had contested the 2013 elections (and were therefore available to run in the by-election). In order to convey to respondents that both

[9] Parliamentary constituencies in Kenya are single-member, first-past-the-post. In the past three election cycles, parliamentary races have become increasingly fragmented, and it is common for there to be more than five candidates for a MP post. This is the aspect of our vignette design that is least realistic, but the simplification renders the vignette both easier to implement and more similar to Kenyan presidential contests.

candidates offered the same promises we added that both these candidates: "are promising to improve the economy of your community. They are:

Candidate 1 is John Onyango, and he is running on the ODM party.

Candidate 2 is John Kamau, and he is running on the TNA party."[10]

Onyango is a very common Luo surname, which would be recognized as such by most Kenyans; Kamau serves as a similar marker denoting Kikuyu ethnicity. Each of the two parties mentioned is a party formed by particular ethnic coalitions, and we hypothesize that members of non-Kikuyu and non-Luo ethnic groups would view their partisan affiliations as indications of their membership in an ethnic coalition. For instance, Luhya voters do not share an ethnicity with Onyango, but Luhya political elites are primarily members of the ODM. Similarly, Kalenjin respondents are not co-ethnic with Kamau, but Kalenjin elites are currently within the TNA partisan alliance.

In order to record the first vote between these two candidates, the respondents were presented with a voting ballot similar to that used in the 2013 elections. This included the name of the candidate and the official logo and name of the party. We excluded the candidate photo that had been included on the 2013 official ballot in order to reduce the presence of an additional cue that might affect voter choice. To preserve the appearance of ballot secrecy, respondents voted and then placed their votes in a see-through bag, which had other folded ballots inside to reassure the respondents that their ballots will be mixed with other ones and would be difficult to identify them. Respondents were also told that the interviewer would not see the results of how the respondent voted, and no-one else would reveal their name or vote. [11] In Appendix B we provide the exact script used for the vignette and in Appendix C we show the ballot design.

After the first ballot was collected, respondents were asked to pick a number between one and nine, which was then used by the enumerator to select the treatment or additional information about the candidates. Treatments involved nine different permutations of information about the following: candidate use of violence in past

[10] Both the TNA and ODM party competed in the MP elections in the great majority of the constituencies across the country, including the ones we sampled. Thus, the combination of these parties contending in a by-election would have been common for most of our respondents. In Kenya is illegal to form parties along ethnic basis, nonetheless MP candidates, as voters, tend to allign with parties according to the candidate's ethnicity. Thus, for a respondent it would not have been uncommon to see a Kikuyu candidate being backed up by the TNA party or a Luo candidate being backed up by the ODM party.

[11] In order to match ballots to other respondent answers, ballots were pre-printed with the serial number, which was later matched with its corresponding questionnaire.

elections and candidate performance while in office. In terms of the first cue (violence), respondents were told either that the candidate had (a) never used violence or (b) had been *rumored* to have ordered a murder and hired gangs *but* had not been arrested for these crimes. To assess the potential countervailing effect of information about candidate quality, some treatments included a positive performance cue. This cue involves information about the candidate's past use of the Constituency Development Fund (CDF) when he previously served as MP in another constituency. A summary of the attributes presented in these nine permutations are shown in Table 2.

The CDF is a development fund available for each of Kenya's constituencies, over which MPs have discretion. It has the reputation for being subject to abuse, which has been documented by independent audits that have been made public and extensively covered in the press.[12] Thus, we added to the positive performance cue that the candidate had been subjected to an independent audit during his last term in office, and the audit found that he had used the CDF "for its intended purpose [and] for good quality projects." For those treatments in which one or both candidates did not include the high quality performance cue, respondents were instead told that: "we do not have any information about how this candidate used the CDF … because he, like the majority of other MPs, was not audited." This is accurate, as independent CDF audits have not been conducted for all MPs. After being read the relevant script, the respondent again voted using the same procedure as above.

The final element of the research design was a question that explored the durability of the respondent's second vote choice in light of additional negative information about the chosen candidate. After the two ballot votes detailed above, we then provided a corruption report to ascertain respondents' sensitivity to misuse of public office. We asked the respondent if she would be more or less likely to vote for their previously preferred candidate if he "*was rumored to have abused his political position and had a lifestyle better than he could afford on his honestly earned income*." We would expect this additional cue to constitute a clearly negative signal. Responses are coded on a 0-4 scale: the respondent expresses that she would not vote for the candidate; the respondent would be less likely to vote for the candidate; the respondent's view is unchanged; or the respondent would be more likely to vote for the

[12] Kenyans are highly aware of the CDF, and 37 percent say that they voted to reelect their MP primarily on the basis of their past management of the CDF (Gutiérrez-Romero 2013a: 83). We therefore see management of the CDF as a sound proxy for MP performance while in office.

candidate. We might expect the majority of our respondents to react negatively to allegations of corruption, but this new information will be assessed against the information previously given to the respondents. Thus, respondents may weigh rumors of abuse of office against a candidate's verified record of good performance (for those respondents that received the performance script), or rumors of corruption may give further credence to rumors of violence that respondents might had previously discounted.

Results

Voting in the First Ballot

In the first ballot respondents were not given any information about the two contending candidates other than their name (hence ethnicity) and party affiliation. Thus, we might view the voting in this first ballot as the baseline case. Overall, vote choice is strongly predicted by the respondents' ethnicity or their ethnic group's partisan coalition position. In other words, as Table 3 shows, Kikuyu and Luo respondents voted for their respective candidates; other respondents voted according to their ethnic group's coalition affiliation. Even for those whose ethnic group had recently changed political coalitions (e.g., Kalenjin respondents), voting was strongly predicted by their group's *current* coalition membership. Of those who cast a valid ballot and had the opportunity to vote for a co-ethnic candidate (the Kikuyu and Luo respondents), over 87 percent voted for their co-ethnic candidate.[13] Approximately 20 percent of Kikuyu and Luo respondents refused to cast their ballots or expressed indifference between the two candidates.

In order to elucidate further the extent to which ethnicity affects voting choice, we estimate a probit regression as in equation (1).

$$Pr(C=1)= \Phi[\alpha_1 X+ \alpha_2 Fractionalization+\alpha_3 Polarization] \quad (1)$$

where $C=1$ represents whether the respondent voted for his/her co-ethnic candidate, Φ is the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal distribution. X represents the respondent's characteristics. In addition to individual-level characteristics that might

[13] The ethnicity variable used here is the response to the question "*What is your tribe*?", asked towards the end of the interview. There were 43 respondents that refused to answer to that question. For these respondents only we imputed their ethnicity from their response to an earlier question "*what is the language of your group of origin*?*",* which allow us to identify the ethnicity of 34 of these respondents.

affect vote choice, we include two measures of the ethnic diversity of the individual's area of residence.

Our dependent variable takes the value of 1 if the Luo or Kikuyu respondents voted for their co-ethnic candidate and 0 if they voted for the other candidate. For those survey respondents that were not Luo nor Kikuyu were not offered the option to vote for a co-ethnic candidate. We however, analyze the effect of their ethnic alliance membership on their voting. We determined whether these respondents voted for a candidate representing an "ethnic ally", in case they voted in our imaginary election for a candidate of the same ethnicity/party affiliation as the one that the respondents' ethnic group voted in the 2013 presidential election. Since the official electoral results are not released by ethnicity, we determined the preferred presidential candidate by ethnic groups using the 2013 exit poll results reported in Ferree et al. (2013). The preferences expressed in this exit poll were consistent with the alliance commitments of elites associated with each ethnic group. By this coding logic, we identified Meru, Embu, and Kalenjin respondents as ethnic allies of the Kikuyu/TNA candidate Kamau, while respondents were coded as ethnic allies of the Luo/ODM candidate Onyango if they were Luhya, Kamba, Kisii, Mijikenda, Maasai, Turkana, and Taita.[14] Following this coding, of those who voted, over 71 percent of our non-Kikuyu, non-Luo respondents cast their first ballot for an ethnic ally.[15]

In addition to the standard controls (gender, ethnicity, education level, province of residence and whether living in a rural area), our probit regression controls for whether the respondent suffered from poverty or victim of electoral violence. As a proxy for lived poverty, we constructed a binary measure based on whether the respondent reported having gone without enough food to eat at any point in the past

[14] In the 2013 elections, Somali split their votes evenly between the two presidential candidates, so they are treated as missing. Though Embu, Turkana, and Taita respondents were not present in significant numbers in the FGL exit poll, county-level election results suggest that the overwhelming majority of Embus voted for TNA / Kenyatta in 2013; the majority of Turkana voted for ODM / Odinga; and the overwhelming majority of Taita voted for ODM / Odinga.

[15] Since our vignette design jointly primes ethnicity and partisanship, individuals might instead be grouped by their expressed partisan identities. Since only 41 percent of our sample say that they feel close to a particular party, we code respondents as copartisan with our candidates when: (a) they expressed a partisan affiliation that is the same as one of the two candidates; or (b) for those individuals who did not express a partisan affiliation, we code them according to their reported presidential vote choice in 2013. Copartisanship performs less well than either the co-ethnicity or the ethnic allies measures. In this first ballot, about 61 percent of valid votes were cast for partisans; when spoiled ballots and refusals were counted as votes against a copartisan, only 49 percent of respondents voted for a copartisan. In the analysis below, we therefore use co-ethnicity and ethnic alliance membership in order to place respondents by treatment.

year. To determine whether an individual had been a victim of electoral violence in the past, we asked respondents if they had personally been affected by electoral violence during any previous election since 1992, which might have included damage to personal property, eviction from their homes, personal injury, or job loss. We also investigate the effects of political sophistication on voting via three proxies: expressed partisanship ("feeling close" to a particular party); reported level of interest in the 2013 presidential election; and reported membership or leadership of an association. Respondents were directly asked about three types of associations: trade unions; farmers, professional, or other business associations; and community development or self-help associations. Though education is included as a control, we keep in mind that it may also be viewed as a measure of political sophistication.

We measure the degree of ethnic diversity of the area where respondents live using two different indices: the index of ethno-linguistic fractionalization proposed by Alesina et al. (2013) and the polarization index proposed by Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2003). [16] We estimate these indices using our nationally representative survey, since there are no official statistics of ethnicity by district in Kenya. Though it would be preferable to use reliable data at the level of the district or enumeration area, we feel that our approach generates a roughly accurate proxy of whether our respondents live in more ethnically diverse or more homogenous districts.[17] In terms of the theoretical reasoning behind the inclusion of these measures, we expect that individuals living in ethnically diverse areas will differ from those living in more homogenous areas due to different expectations about the ability of politicians to target public goods or clientelistic rewards. This is consistent with how they are generally used in the literature. Esteban et al. (2012) argue that measures of ethnic polarization are most suitable in contexts where conflict over public payoffs and political power are structured

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[16] These indices are estimated as $Fragmentation = 1 - \sum_{g=1}^{N} s_{gd}^{\,2}$ and $Polarization_{\mathrm{d}} = 1 - \sum_{g=1}^{N} \left(\frac{0.5 - s_{gd}}{0.5} \right)^2 s_{gd}$ where s_{gd} is the share of group g (g=1…N) in district d. We measure an individual's membership to an ethnic group in these indices using the question "*what is the language of your group of origin*?".

[17] Since 1969, the government census department has not released data on ethnicity for fear that it would stoke ethnic tensions. Some scholars (Kasara 2012) have imputed local-level diversity from the surnames listed on voters rolls at individual polling stations for the Rift Valley. We believe that our survey provides a good proxy for ethnic diversity given that it relies on a randomly selected sample at national level. Moreover, we use self-reported language to estimate ethnic diversity instead of imputing ethnicity from the 1964 geographic distribution of surnames (as in Kasara).

on group lines. Put differently, polarization measures in Esteban and Ray (1994) and Montalvo and Querol (2003) are designed to measure socio-economic "antagonism" across groups. Indices of fractionalization, on the other hand are also suitable to capture conflicts whenever they are over private payoffs such as access to resource rents or clientelism dividends. In this case, one should pay attention that fractionalization indices have decreasing marginal returns to conflict. That is social tension might increase the more fragmented the society is, but to a point where ethnic diversity has increased so much that the likelihood of conflict would decrease rather than increase.

Table 4 presents the marginal effects of respondents' ethnicity and other factors on the probability of voting for a co-ethnic or ethnic ally candidate in the first ballot.[18] In column (1) we focus only on the Luos and Kikuyus, the respondents who share an ethnicity with one of the two candidates. We find that these two ethnic groups have the same probability of voting for their respective co-ethnic candidate (column 1). For these two ethnic groups, the only covariate that increases their chances of voting for their co-ethnic candidate is whether they reside in a rural area (column 2). The Luos and Kikuyus living in a rural area were nearly 10 percent more likely to vote for their co-ethnic candidate than those living in an urban area. Neither gender, education level, food deprivation, being close to a political party, interest in elections, associational membership, past experience of electoral violence, nor our two indices of ethnic diversity had any significant effect on voter choice in the first ballot.

In column (3), we focus exclusively on the non-Luos and non-Kikuyos voting for an ethnic ally candidate. These respondents were equally likely to vote for their ethnic ally candidate. Notably, those living in more ethnically fragmented districts were 42 percent less likely to vote for their ethnic ally candidate than those living in less fragmented districts. This is consistent with the expectation that commitment to an ethnic alliance would be lower among those voters who live in more mixed or "cosmopolitan" areas. It is possible that these respondents feel they would be less likely to receive group-targeted benefits from ethnically-allied politicians, or these respondents may feel less strong attachment to their ethnic identity – though it is notable that this effect is not observed among Kikuyu or Luo respondents.

Self-selection of Respondents in the First Ballot: Heckit Regression

Given the number of respondents who did not cast a ballot, our results might be influenced by self-selection into the respondent pool. Approximately 14 percent of respondents refused to vote in the first vignette without stating a reason (N=172), and a further four percent who cast ballots left them blank.

To detect and correct if necessary for such self-selection bias due to this abstention behavior, we ran a separate Heckit model specification. The Heckit regression is estimated in two steps. In the first step we estimate the probability of a respondent refusing to play the game, as shown in equation (2).

$$Pr\,(R=1|Z)=\Phi[Z\gamma] \qquad (2)$$

where R indicates if the respondent agreed to vote for one of the two candidates in the election game; Z is a vector of explanatory variables that includes respondent ethnicity, gender, food deprivation, victimization during past electoral violence, rural residence. We also include the fragmentation and polarization indices for the respondent's district of residence, as well as provincial fixed effects. As external instruments, we use interviewers' randomly assigned identification number, as well as their number of years of experience doing interviews.[19] This allows us to see whether a respondent's abstention behavior is associated with either the skill or other characteristics of individual interviewers. More experienced, more skilled interviewers may have affected how comfortable a respondent felt during the interview, and it may have affected the respondent's willingness to participate in the voting game, though it would not have directly affected how the respondent voted. In the second stage, we run a Heckit probit regression, which estimates the marginal effects affecting whether respondents voted for their co-ethnic (ally) candidate, as shown in equation (3). This regression corrects for a potential bias in self-selection by incorporating a transformation of these predicted individual probabilities of response, λ, which is added as an explanatory variable.

$$Pr(C=1)=\Phi[\beta_1 X+\beta_2 Fractionalization+\beta_3 Polarization+\rho\sigma_u\lambda(Z\gamma)] \qquad (3)$$

where ρ is the correlation between the unobserved determinants of respondents agreeing to playing the election game, u is the unobserved determinants of voting for their co-ethnic candidate, and σ_u is the standard deviation of u.

[19] In a few cases where the heckit regression model did not coverge we also added as another covariate the interviewers' mother tongue.

As shown in Table A.5 in Appendix, we find evidence of self-selection in model 2. Despite that, our results remain similar as shown before. The Luos and Kikuyus were equally likely to vote for their respective co-ethnic candidate. Those living in rural areas were more likely to vote for their co-ethnic candidate, although at a slightly smaller margin than before (7.2 percent more likely to do so according to the Heckit regression).

Voting in the Second Ballot: Impact of Violence and Performance Cues

We move on to analyze how the treatments used in the second vignette changed voting choice. Respondents received additional cues about each candidate: (a) *rumored* use of violence in past elections; (b) results of an audit of the candidate's past use of CDF funds, which indicate whether the candidate had performed well during his previous term as a MP.

We use a probit model to examine the impact of these cues on the likelihood of respondents voting for their preferred co-ethnic candidate in this second ballot. The dependent variable takes the value of 1 if respondents voted for their co-ethnic (ally) candidate in this second ballot, and takes the value of 0 if voted for the rival candidate in this second ballot. As covariate we include the "treatment" given to each respondent. That is the set of nine different combinations of cues on violence and past performance about both candidates. The first of these treatments did not provide any additional cues on violence nor performance, thus serves as our reference group.

Table 5 reports the marginal effects of each treatment on voting for the ethnically-preferred candidate. Columns 1-5 focus on the Luo and Kikuyu respondents only, whereas columns 6-10 focus on the voting choices of the other ethnic groups analyzed. We focus on these two blocks of respondents separately to assess whether ethnic allies process violence or performance cues differently from those who share an ethnic identity with either candidates. We find some differences in voting choices between the two groups, albeit with some strong commonalities in responses to cues.

Both co-ethnic and ethnic ally respondents sanction politicians who use violence when they face non-violent opponents, and neither of them has any cue on performance, as can be observed in treatments 2 and 3. In particular, the marginal effects of treatment 2 show that respondents penalize heavily their co-ethnic (ally) candidates when rumored using violence when compared to a rival candidate who does not use violence. Specifically, the probability that a respondent will vote for her co-ethnic is reduced by 35.7 percent when he is rumored to have used violence in the past election, while this

probability is reduced by 17 percent for the ethnic allies. This disparity in the size of the dampening effect is likely explained by the somewhat lower proportion of respondents who vote for their ethnic ally in the absence of additional cues (reference group/ treatment 1).

Treatment 3 also shows that ethnic alliances reward their co-ethnic ally candidate by increasing the probability of voting for them by 17.6 percent when not using violence and facing a rival candidate who is rumored to use violence. This result is consistent with the violence sanctioning mechanism. For those who share ethnicity with the candidates, we do not see any significant increases in support for their non-violent co-ethnic, but this is presumably because ethnic voting is already very high in the reference group. Other groups may increase their support of an ethnic ally when he faces a violent rival because of the same sanctioning mechanism that underlies the reduced support for violent co-ethnic or ethnic ally politicians. Alternatively, it may be that respondents fear they would be the victims of violence perpetrated by the rival politician. We discuss further this potential mechanism when looking at the voting behavior of those victims of electoral violence in next sub-section.

In treatments 4 and 5 we test the "trade-off" hypothesis, the idea that high-performing candidates are more likely to be "forgiven" for their use of violence. To this end, we pair a well-performing but rumored violent candidate versus a non-violent rival. We find respondents abandon their co-ethnic candidate when he is well-performing but rumored violent. Moreover, the defection from violent co-ethnics is *higher* for treatments in which the violent candidates are well-performing (treatments 4) than in those in which there is no performance cue for the violent candidate (treatments 2). For instance, respondents are 35.7 percent less likely to vote for a violent co-ethnic in the absence of a performance cue, but they are an additional 12 percent *less* likely to vote for a violent co-ethnic when he *also* is described as highly-performing in terms of the CDF (column 1, treatments 2 and 4). We would expect the opposite if high performance in office moderated the negative effect of rumored violence on vote choice.

As before, in treatment 5, we find violence sanctioning mechanism among ethnic allies. In this treatment they reward their non-violent co-ethnic ally candidate if the rival candidate is rumored to be both violent and well-performance record, by increasing the probability of voting for them by 15.6 percent. Again, we find no evidence of such reward for the Luo and Kikuyu respondents, they are still equally

likely to vote for the non-violent candidate even if the rival candidate is well-performing and rumored violent.

There are scattered suggestions that respondents may sometimes take into account performance when evaluating politicians, especially for respondents who share ethnicity with the candidates. For instance, in treatments 7 and 8, a well-performing but rumored violent candidate faces a violent rival that has no cue on performance. We find that on the one hand allies do not penalize nor reward their violent ethic ally candidate when facing also a violent rival. On the other, the Luos and Kikuyus penalize their violent co-ethnic candidate, and do so more when facing a rival candidate that is violent but is well-performing. Specifically, the pairing of candidates in Treatment 7 results in a 27 percent decline in support for a co-ethnic candidate (column 1), a smaller decline in support than the 35.7 percent decline in the absence of the performance cue (column 1, treatment 2). Similarly, in treatment 8, respondents penalize even more, by reducing the probability of voting for their co-ethnic by 44 percent when their violent co-ethnic faces a violent but well-performing rival (column 1, treatments 8).

In treatments 6 and 9, as robustness checks we provided both candidates with the same set of cues (either both are rumored to have used violence or both rumored to have used violence and good performers). As expected, we find no change in the probability for voting for these co-ethnic (ally) candidates in neither of these cases.

Overall, the results for the full pool are not strong or consistent enough to conclude that vote choice can be swayed by trade-offs between violence and high-performance. Instead, the negative effect of rumored violence is much stronger than any potentially positive effect of good performance.

We next explore the mediating effects that our treatments had depending on whether the respondents have been direct victims of electoral violence or have been food deprived. We split these groups according to whether they are Luos/Kikuyus or members of other ethnic groups.

Victims of violence

Twenty percent of respondents stated that they had been directly affected by electoral violence since 1992, in terms of personal injury, destruction of property, suffering economic losses, having land disputes or being forced to leave their land or home. This figure is consistent with that from a nationally representative survey conducted in Kenya in 2008 by Gutiérrez-Romero (2014). We find that these victims of violence

have a distinctive voting behavior. They are simply less responsive to cues of violence than other respondents. For instance, in Treatments 2 and 4, unlike the results presented above, the respondents who were victims of violence do *not* penalize their violent co-ethnic candidate (column 2) or their ethnic ally (column 7) for the use of violence when paired with a non-violent rival. This would seem consistent with an "ethnic defense" interpretation of respondents' evaluation of violent politicians: those who have borne the past costs of ethnic violence in Kenya are more likely to view the use of violence by co-ethnic and allied politicians as either justified or necessary in order to protect the group from victimization by rival ethnic groups. Notably, this effect extends beyond respondents who share an ethnicity with the politician.

The ethnic ally respondents who have also been victims of violence reward their non-violent ethnic allies when rivals are violent by increasing the probability of voting for their co-ethnic candidate in 27 percent (Treatment 3), versus the 17.6 percent bump received for all ethnic ally respondents. Earlier we argued that co-ethnic allies might be rewarding their non-violent co-ethnic candidates by fear of being attacked by rival candidates. Yet, in treatment 5, these victims of violence do not reward their non-violent co-ethnic candidate when facing a rumored violent but well-performing rival candidate. Thus, casting doubt on the strength or consistency of this fear-based mechanism.

Food deprivation

Roughly half of our respondents reported having gone without food at least one in the prior year. Consistent with others' research on clientelism, we might expect that these respondents are less likely to sanction politicians for violations of democratic norms. Given that our performance cue is linked to politicians' past track record in reducing poverty, we also might expect the performance cue to have a greater impact on poor respondents than others.

Generally, as with victims of electoral violence, we find that the food deprived are less responsive to cues than the rest of population, providing further support for the trade-off hypothesis (columns 4 & 9, across all treatments). The food deprived do not penalize violent co-ethnics *so long as they are also well-performing* (column 4, treatment 4), and we observe a similar failure to sanction violent but well-performing ethnic allies among the food deprived (column 9, treatment 4).

In treatment 8, when both candidates use violence, but only the rival politician is well-performing, the food deprived do not defect in favor of the well-performing candidate, unlike their non-food deprived counterparts (column 4). This would seem to suggest a recognition amongst these respondents that the benefits of high-performing ethnic rivals are unlikely to accrue to their own group.

Political sophistication and Ethnic Diversity

We also explore the effects of political sophistication, education and living in ethnically diverse districts. These marginal effects can be found in Tables A.7 and A.8 in Appendix A. Overall, the behavior of respondents with high level of education (completed secondary or more) is very similar to the average population. Those who stated were interested in the 2013 presidential were more likely to sanction violent politicians for both Luo/Kikuyu respondents as well as for those of ethnic groups (columns 3 and 9, Table A.7 and Table A.8). In this case political awareness serves as a sanctioning filter.

Those living in highly fragmented and polarized districts (those with a diversity index above the average) were less likely to penalize their co-ethnic candidates. For instance, respondents in Treatment 2, when a rumored violent co-ethnic faces a non-violent candidate, did not penalize their co-ethnic candidate (columns 5, 6, 11 and 12, Table A.7). Similarly in Treatment 7, rumored violent co-ethnic but well-performing was not penalized when facing a violent candidate.

The most intriguing result is the effect of associational membership. Above, we speculated that associational involvement would serve as a route to greater political sophistication and, consequently, greater adherence to democratic norms. We find, however, that active associational members were *more* likely to support violent politicians than their less "sophisticated" counterparts (columns 2 and 8, Table A.8). That was the case in Treatment 2 when the violent co-ethnic candidate was facing a non-violent rival, as well as in Treatment 7 when the violent co-ethnic candidate was well-performing and facing a facing a violent rival. It is unclear why for this group the cue on violence acts as a positive incentive to vote for a violent co-ethnic candidate. One possibility is that associations (e.g. trade and professional unions) are closely linked to political parties, boosting the strength of the partisan cue; alternatively, perhaps more likely, associations may be segregated on ethnic lines and might therefore

boost ethnic solidarity. In these cases, co-ethnicity may trump dislike for the use of violence.

Self-Selection of Respondents in the Second Ballot: Heckit Regression

Although the ethnic distribution of respondents was roughly balanced across the nine treatments (Table A.2), we observe that the percentage of voting for the Kikuyu and Luo candidate differed markedly across some treatments (Table A.3). Some treatments also had a higher rate of respondents refusing to vote. There were several individuals who did not participate in the second ballot. 45 respondents (3.7 percent of sample) refused to pick a number and therefore did not vote in the second vignette.[20] Among those who did pick up a number, 7.5 percent refused to vote afterwards and did not provide a reason. Table A.4, shows the various reasons respondents gave for refusing to vote across the nine treatments. It is harder to interpret the actions of the significant number of individuals who did not refuse in this way but also did not cast valid ballots: 97 (8%) either marked both candidates or left their ballots blank; a further 101 individuals (8.6%) said they were indifferent between candidates and did not cast a ballot. Since a small but still considerable number of people refused to vote, we once again face the possibility of self-selection bias. We again use a Heckit model to test and correct if necessary for this possible bias, using the same procedure described above. In order to estimate the probability of participation in the second ballot, we use the same Z vector of instruments and control variables as above and we also include the treatment number the respondent received. We do this because the positive or negative information received in each treatment may have affected the respondent's choice to continue. Then, we estimate a probit Heckit regression, using as dependent variable whether the respondents voted for their co-ethnic (ally) candidate whilst controlling for the treatment received and correcting for a potential bias in the self-selection of respondents.

We find no evidence of self-selection for Kikuyu or Luo respondents (Table A.6). For ethnic allies we find evidence of self-selection only in Table 5, model 9 (those food deprived) and model 10 (non-food deprived) as well as in Table A.8 for those interested in elections. Nevertheless, when correcting for this self-selection bias, the results are very similar to those presented earlier.

[20] Even those who refused to vote in the first ballot were asked to participate in the second ballot. A substantial number of our refusals refused to vote in both ballots.

Voting in the Third Ballot: Additional Cue on Corruption

Following the sequential design of our survey experiment, we examine the effect of an additional corruption cue on past vote choice. That is, after respondents made a choice based on the attributes of each of the candidates in the second ballot, we concluded the election game with the question: "*If your most preferred candidate between these two was rumored to have abused his political position and having a lifestyle that was better than he could afford on his honestly earned income. Would you be more or less likely to vote for him?*".

Here, we analyze the probability of respondents answering that they would still vote for their preferred co-ethnic (ally) candidate using a probit specification. As covariates, we use the set of nine possible treatments in the previous ballot. This allows us to examine whether respondents were less committed to their vote choices – or more "cross-pressured" – when they faced particular combinations of candidate attributes. For instance, a respondent might "forgive" a co-ethnic for his use of violence in the second ballot; however, when faced with still further evidence of the candidate's violation of democratic norms (i.e., corrupt use of public office), that respondent may be more likely to change her mind than if she had not received information regarding violence.

The additional cue on corruption did nothing to make respondents change their mind and vote instead for the rival candidate (Table 6). In fact, in some cases, respondents replied that the additional cue on corruption made them still more likely to vote for their co-ethnic candidate. That is for instance the case for the Luos and Kikuyus in Treatment 5, when their co-ethnic candidate is not violent but facing a violent and well-performing rival candidate. Similarly, among the ethnic allies who had voted for their preferred ethnic-ally candidate the additional cue on corruption made them still more likely to vote for their candidate. Treatments 4 and 7 are the only exception where the additional cue on corruption does not increase the likelihood of respondents stating that they will still vote for their ethnic ally candidate. In both these treatments their preferred ethnic ally candidate is violent, corrupt and well-performing facing a non-violent rival candidate (treatment 4) or a violent rival candidate (treatment 7). Interestingly, for both these treatments the food deprived and victims of violence were more likely to still state that they would vote for their preferred ethnic ally candidate.

Self-selection of respondents in the Third ballot: Heckit regression

Using heckit regressions as before to analyze and correct if necessary for the self-selection when analyzing the probability of respondents answering that they would still vote for their co-ethnic (ally), after the cue on corruption.

We find evidence of self-selection for food and non-food deprived Kikuyu/Luo respondents (columns 4 and 5, Table A.9). For ethnic allies we also find some evidence of self-selection, but only among the victims of violence (column 7). Correcting for that self-selection bias, the results are very similar to those presented earlier.

Effect of Violence on Turnout

The percentage of people who refused to vote in the second ballot was noticeably different across the nine treatments analyzed (Table A.4). Thus, it is likely that turnout was influenced by the cues that respondents heard about the contending candidates, particularly with respect to the rumors of violence.

To assess whether rumors of violence dampened turnout we estimate the extent to which the probability of refusing to vote was affected by the treatments received. As before we use a probit model, where the dependent variable takes the value of 1 if the respondent refused to vote, and 0 otherwise.

Table 7 shows the marginal effects on refusing to vote. As shown across columns 1 to 5, the turnout of the Kikuyus and Luos is similar across all nine treatments, regardless of whether these respondents were food deprived or victims of violence. That is, they do not get discouraged to vote depending on the cues that the candidates received. In contrast, the ethnic allies are more likely to refuse to vote whenever both candidates are rumoured to be violent and neither of them have a mention on performance (treatment 6, columns 6 to 10). These finding support the predictions of theoretical literature on the strategic use of violence to win elections (Collier and Vicente 2012). Violence is used to discourage turnout of moderate supporters, but it is not effective to affect the turnout of strong supporters, such as the Kikuyus and Luos.

Interestingly, turnout was not affected for neither group in Treatment 8. That is when both candidates are rumoured to be violent and both are well-performing. The performance cue is likely to have increased the cost of opportunity of not voting, thus turnout was not affected by the rumours of violence in this case. This could explain why

in Kenya the turnout has been relatively high, despite the frequent electoral irregularities in terms of intimidation and use of gangs.

In one of the treatments (treatment 5) turnout actually increases for the co-ethnic allies. That is the case when their co-ethnic ally is not-violent, and the other candidate is rumoured to be violent and well-performing. The ethnic allies could have perceived that the rival candidate was going to benefit rival ethnic groups, thus the performance cue encouraged them to vote (against that candidate).

Conclusion

Kenyans voted for Uhuru Kenyata and William Ruto in the 2013 elections as President and Deputy President, despite the fact that they both faced trial at the ICC for crimes against humanity. Why would voters in Kenya, and other similar countries, vote for allegedly violent candidates in a democratic process whilst having other viable candidates? In this context, one of the most compelling explanations for persistent voting for violent candidates is that citizens forgive violent politicians because they expect those politicians will deliver benefits once in office. In this paper we empirically tested this "trade-off" hypothesis by providing voters counterbalancing cues about two competing candidates in a hypothetical election. Specifically, we provided cues about *rumored* use of violence in past elections and about good record in office, proxied by past management of CDF funds, Kenya's major poverty alleviation policy instrument.

We found that ordinary voters in our vignette experiments sanctioned rumored violent politicians, regardless of whether those politicians were their co-ethnics, belonged to a party with which their ethnic group is associated with, or had a good record in office. Although these results suggest a promising outlook for the future of democracy in Kenya, we also found evidence to support the trade-off hypothesis in a substantial percentage of the population. Victims of electoral violence, those living in poverty or in ethnically polarized areas endorsed their co-ethnic candidates when rumored to have used violence or even abused their political position for personal benefit whenever these candidates also had a cue about good record in office.

Our results support non-experimental research that suggests ethnic-voting in countries like Kenya is driven by the expected clientelistic dividends co-ethnic candidates bring (Gutiérrez-Romero 2013b). These expected dividends might also explain the support of violent candidates among those victims of violence. Electoral violence in Kenya has been linked to struggles over land ownership among ethnic

groups. Thus, information about a candidate's use of violence may operate, for some individuals, as a positive signal rather than a negative one. Habituation to violence could be another reason why certain groups are more tolerant of violent candidates.

We also empirically tested the theoretical assumption that electoral violence is an effective strategy to reduce turnout. With non-experimental data it is difficult to assess what would have been the turnout level had electoral irregularities such as violence and vote-buying not occurred. Our vignette allowed us to control the information cues to voters and show that violence indeed can affect turnout, particularly of ethnic allies (the moderate supporters). We also found that violence can increase turnout when in addition to the rumors of violence there is also a high cost of opportunity of not voting. That is when the rival co-ethnic candidate is perceived to bring benefits to rival groups.

Despite the constitutional reforms implemented after the 2007 disputed election and the pending ICC trials, Kenyan politicians have continued intimidating voters and using gangs to win elections (Human Rights Watch 2013, p.1). Given the prevalence of these electoral irregularities, it is perhaps not surprising that nearly a quarter of our respondents agree that politicians need to intimidate their opponents and hire gangs if they want to win elections. Nonetheless, we found that respondents often discount rumors of the use of violence. This might explain why political violence has done little to harm to the careers of prominent politicians in the country.

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Figures and Tables

TABLE 1 Respondents' Votes in 2002, 2007 and 2013 Presidential Elections

	2002		2007		2013	
	Mwai Kibaki (Kikuyu origin)	Uhuru Kenyatta (Kikuyu origin)	Mwai Kibaki (Kikuyu origin)	Raila Odinga (Luo origin)	Uhuru Kenyatta (Kikuyu origin)	Raila Odinga (Luo origin)
Kikuyu	92.1	7.9	90.68	6.21	87.7	8.0
Luo	96.3	3.7	15.15	81.06	6.8	91.2
Luhya	85.6	14.4	37.3	42.86	28.8	60.2
Kamba	97.7	2.3	18.95	42.11	14.9	79.3
Embu/Meru	94.0	6.0	92.55	6.38	88.9	5.1
Kissi	95.7	4.3	42.37	52.54	35.6	52.1
Kalenjin	83.1	17.0	32.5	58.75	73.0	13.5
Mijikenda	91.1	8.9	25.45	67.27	9.6	80.8
Somali	100.0	0.0	21.21	63.64	35.7	64.3
Others	100.0	0.0	38.78	59.18	35.7	53.6
Average	92.8	7.2	46.27	43.21	45.3	47.5

Source: Authors' survey

FIGURE 1 The Most Important Candidate's Qualification Respondent Considered when Deciding Who to Vote in 2013 Presidential and MP Election



Source: Authors' survey

FIGURE 2 The Main Reason why Did Not Vote for Kenyata or Raila Odinga in 2013 Presidential Election



Source: Authors' survey

FIGURE 3 Believe President Uhuru Kenyata is Responsible for the Violence of 2007 Elections



Source: Authors' survey

TABLE 2 Treatments in Second Vignette

	John Kamau (Kikuyu candidate)	John Onyango (Luo candidate)
Treatment 1	Never used violence.	Never used violence.
Treatment 2	Rumored to have used violence but not arrested.	Never used violence.
Treatment 3	Rumored to have used violence but not arrested. Evidence of good performance.	Never used violence. Not audited so we don't know if performed well or not.
Treatment 4	Never used violence.	Rumored to have used violence but not arrested.
Treatment 5	Rumored to have used violence but not arrested.	Rumored to have used violence but not arrested.
Treatment 6	Rumored to have used violence but not arrested. Evidence of good performance.	Rumored to have used violence but not arrested. Not audited so we don't know if performed well or not.
Treatment 7	Never used violence. Not audited so we don't know if performed well or not.	Rumored to have used violence but not arrested. Evidence of good performance.
Treatment 8	Rumored to have used violence but not arrested. Not audited so we don't know if performed well or not.	Rumored to have used violence but not arrested. Evidence of good performance.
Treatment 9	Rumored to have used violence but not arrested. Evidence of good performance.	Rumored to have used violence but not arrested. Evidence of good performance.

TABLE 3 Respondents' Votes in Imaginary Local Election in First Vignette

	Voted for:					
	John Kamau (Kikuyu candidate)	John Onyango (Luo candidate)	Both candidates in ballot	Blank ballot	Said indifferent	Refused to vote
Kikuyu	67.7	11.8	2.0	4.9	4.9	8.8
Luo	9.4	71.8	0.6	3.9	7.7	6.6
Luhya	22.6	63.8	0.6	1.7	4.0	7.3
Kamba	26.0	63.4	0.8	1.6	3.3	4.9
Meru	46.9	10.8	0.9	10.8	17.1	13.5
Kissi	25.6	57.8	0.0	10.0	2.2	4.4
Kalenjin	62.3	27.9	0.0	0.8	2.5	6.6
Mijikenda	15.1	65.8	2.7	1.4	4.1	11.0
Somali	34.2	39.0	2.4	2.4	12.2	9.8
Others	43.0	39.2	0.0	2.5	5.1	10.1
Average	36.4	44.8	0.9	4.0	5.9	8.0

Source: Authors' survey

TABLE 4 Marginal Effects of Respondents Voting for their Preferred Co-ethnic Candidate in First Ballot

Dependent variable> Equal 1 if voted for preferred co-ethnic candidate in ballot 1. Equal 0 if voted for non-preferred co-ethnic in ballot 1.

Sample>	Kikuyu/Luo only		Ethnic allies only (Meru,embu,kalenjin / luhya, kissi, kamba, massai, mijikenda, taita, turkana)
	Probit (1)	Probit (2)	Probit (3)
Luo (Kikuyu reference group)	0.033	-0.043	
	(0.053)	(0.061)	
Luhya			-0.060
			(0.296)
Kamba			-0.056
			(0.286)
Meru			-0.014
			(0.272)
Kisii			-0.176
			(0.313)
Kalenjin			-0.150
			(0.318)
Maasai			-0.459
			(0.295)
Mijikenda			-0.006
			(0.288)
Taita			-0.215
			(0.309)
Turkana			-0.350
			(0.341)
Embu			
Food Deprivation		0.070	0.057
		(0.051)	(0.044)
Secondary school or more		-0.049	0.023
		(0.048)	(0.044)
Female		-0.010	0.008
		(0.039)	(0.037)
Rural		0.097**	-0.045
		(0.033)	(0.045)
Victim of electoral violence		-0.016	0.055
		(0.042)	(0.047)
District ethnic fragmentation index		0.113	-0.420**
		(0.158)	(0.147)
District ethnic polarization index		0.186	0.100
		(0.215)	(0.131)
Interested in 2013 presidential elections		0.021	-0.002
		(0.048)	(0.059)
Associational membership		0.025	0.043
		(0.043)	(0.041)
Feels close to a political party		-0.021	0.051
		(0.024)	(0.040)
Province fixed effects		Yes	Yes
Pseudo R2	0.003	0.097	0.078
Observations	309	286	594

*Significance Level * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.001. Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at constituency level.*

TABLE 5 Marginal Effects of Violence and Performance Cues on Probability of Respondents Voting for their Preferred Co-ethnic Candidate in Second Ballot

Dependent variable> Equal 1 if voted for preferred co-ethnic candidate in ballot 2. Equal 0 if voted for non-preferred co-ethnic in ballot 2.

Sample>	Kikuyu/Luo only					Ethnic allies only (Meru,embu,kalenjin / luhya, kissi, kamba, massai, mijikenda, taita, turkana)				
	All Probit (1)	Victims of violence Probit (2)	Non-victims of violence Probit (3)	Food deprived Probit (4)	Non-food deprived Probit (5)	All Probit (6)	Victims of violence Probit (7)	Non-victims of violence Probit (8)	Food deprived Probit (9)	Non-food deprived Probit (10)
Treatment 1: Reference group neither candidate had a cue on performance or violence										
T2: Co-ethnic candidate rumoured violent, the other candidate no rumor on violence	-0.357**	-	-0.396**	-0.330*	-0.366	-0.177**	-0.012	-0.228**	-0.084	-0.271**
	(0.161)		(0.171)	(0.197)	(0.294)	(0.083)	(0.174)	(0.092)	(0.120)	(0.119)
T3: Co-ethnic is not violent, other candidate is rumoured violent	-0.127	-0.138	-0.123	-0.074	-0.191	0.176**	0.274**	0.158*	0.199**	0.157
	(0.113)	(0.252)	(0.142)	(0.146)	(0.154)	(0.076)	(0.125)	(0.088)	(0.086)	(0.097)
T4: Co-ethnic is rumoured violent but good performance. The other candidate is not violent, no cue on performance	-0.476***	-0.288	-0.566***	-0.135	-0.680***	-0.192**	-0.199	-0.194**	-0.112	-0.259**
	(0.129)	(0.261)	(0.170)	(0.186)	(0.125)	(0.074)	(0.180)	(0.099)	(0.117)	(0.109)
T5: Co-ethnic is not violent, no cue on performance. The other candidate is rumoured violent but good performance	-0.137	-0.204	-0.137	-0.074	-0.219	0.156**	0.066	0.175**	0.165*	0.144*
	(0.144)	(0.327)	(0.154)	(0.161)	(0.231)	(0.064)	(0.157)	(0.073)	(0.094)	(0.087)
T6: Both candidates romoured used violence, no mention on performance on either of them	-0.130	-0.097	-0.145	-	-0.299	0.013	-0.012	0.020	0.090	-0.059
	(0.127)	(0.285)	(0.164)		(0.183)	(0.080)	(0.132)	(0.095)	(0.081)	(0.122)
T7:Co-ethnic romoured used violence, but good performance. The other candidate rumoured used violence,no cue on performance	-0.273*	-0.241	-0.283	-	-0.451**	0.028	0.065	0.018	0.051	0.014
	(0.157)	(0.297)	(0.175)		(0.185)	(0.090)	(0.325)	(0.106)	(0.106)	(0.155)
T8: Co-ethnic rumoured used violence,no cue on performance. The other candidate rumoured used violence, but good performance	-0.437**	-0.607**	-0.404**	-0.380	-0.493**	-0.035	0.091	-0.081	0.085	-0.209
	(0.168)	(0.272)	(0.185)	(0.279)	(0.202)	(0.094)	(0.128)	(0.123)	(0.128)	(0.165)
T9: Both candidates rumoured used violence and both were good performers	-0.022	0.000	-0.018	-0.005	-0.057	0.016	0.000	0.015	-0.064	0.087
	(0.136)	(0.243)	(0.167)	(0.159)	(0.233)	(0.085)	(0.221)	(0.099)	(0.125)	(0.120)
Pseudo R2	0.094	0.091	0.110	0.079	0.130	0.051	0.036	0.062	0.041	0.078
Observations	253	59	193	94	139	573	108	465	282	290

*Significance Level * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.001. Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at constituency level.*

TABLE 6 Marginal Effects of Respondents Voting for their Preferred Co-ethnic Candidate in Third Ballot

Dependent variable> Equal 1 if voted for preferred co-ethnic candidate in 2nd and 3rd Ballot. Equal 0 if voted for preferred co-ethnic candidate in 2nd ballot but in 3rd ballot claimed would not vote for preferred co-ethnic candidate.

Sample>	Kikuyu/Luo only					Ethnic allies only (Meru,embu,kalenjin / luhya, kissi,				
	All Probit (1)	Victims of violence Probit (2)	Non-victims of violence Probit (3)	Food deprived Probit (4)	Non-food deprived Probit (5)	All Probit (6)	Victims of violence Probit (7)	Non-victims of violence Probit (8)	Food deprived Probit (9)	Non-food deprived Probit (10)
Treatment 1: Reference group co-ethnic rumoured corrupt. Neither candidate with other cues on performance or violence.										
T2: Co-ethnic candidate rumored violent and corrupt, the other candidate no rumor on violence	0.191	-	0.251	0.275	0.070	0.218*	0.279	0.221	0.298*	0.242
	(0.184)		(0.169)	(0.243)	(0.224)	(0.123)	(0.249)	(0.144)	(0.177)	(0.180)
T3: Co-ethnic is not violent but is rumored corrupt, other candidate is rumoured violent	0.072	-0.248	0.173	0.169	0.000	0.193*	0.075	0.183	0.420**	0.000
	(0.130)	(0.181)	(0.115)	(0.234)	(0.131)	(0.114)	(0.308)	(0.127)	(0.171)	(0.146)
T4: Co-ethnic is rumored violent and corrupt, but has good performance. The other candidate is not violent, no cue on performance	-0.073	-0.037	-0.164	-0.090	0.000	0.127	0.226*	0.096	0.331**	-0.023
	(0.184)	(0.219)	(0.236)	(0.250)	(0.249)	(0.133)	(0.127)	(0.151)	(0.164)	(0.195)
T5: Co-ethnic is not violent but is rumored corrupt, no cue on performance. The other candidate is rumored violent but good performance	0.287**	-	0.350**	0.365**	0.208	0.323***	0.521**	0.273**	0.450**	0.269*
	(0.122)		(0.109)	(0.161)	(0.156)	(0.095)	(0.231)	(0.114)	(0.144)	(0.151)
T6: Both candidates rumored used violence, but co-ethnic candidate rumored corrupt. No mention on performance on either of them	0.136	0.022	0.167	0.037	0.203	0.212*	0.360	0.173	0.171	0.316**
	(0.151)	(0.292)	(0.154)	(0.213)	(0.224)	(0.128)	(0.243)	(0.145)	(0.205)	(0.139)
T7:Co-ethnic rumored used violence, is corrupt, but good performance. The other candidate rumored used violence,no cue on performance	0.129	-	0.330**	0.136	0.115	0.235	0.478**	0.183	0.322*	0.242
	(0.176)		(0.157)	(0.279)	(0.191)	(0.148)	(0.182)	(0.173)	(0.191)	(0.175)
T8: Co-ethnic rumored used violence and is corrupt,no cue on performance. The other candidate rumored used violence, but good performance	0.075	-	0.129	0.037	0.070	0.261*	0.601**	0.179	0.559***	0.044
	(0.145)		(0.159)	(0.332)	(0.143)	(0.151)	(0.304)	(0.177)	(0.123)	(0.223)
T9: Both candidates rumored used violence and both were good performers. But co-ethnic candidate rumored corrupt.						0.229*	0.075	0.290**	0.322*	0.242
						(0.131)	(0.309)	(0.135)	(0.182)	(0.217)
Pseudo R2	0.030	0.056	0.055	0.062	0.023	0.025	0.124	0.020	0.063	0.053
Observations	174	27	138	83	91	324	60	264	163	160

*Significance Level * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.001. Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at constituency level. -Predicts success perfectly.*

TABLE 7 Marginal Effects of Violence and Performance Cues on Probability of Respondents Refusing to Vote in Second Ballot

	Kikuyu/Luo only					Ethnic allies only (Meru,embu,kalenjin / luhya, kissi,				
	All Probit (1)	Victims of violence Probit (2)	Non-victims of violence Probit (3)	Food deprived Probit (4)	Non-food deprived Probit (5)	All Probit (6)	Victims of violence Probit (7)	Non-victims of violence Probit (8)	Food deprived Probit (9)	Non-food deprived Probit (10)
Treatment 1: Reference group neither candidate had a cue on performance or violence										
T2: Co-ethnic candidate rumoured violent, the other candidate no rumor on violence	0.205	0.053	0.258	0.204	0.214	0.043	0.052	0.050	0.036	0.056
	(0.153)	(0.203)	(0.159)	(0.180)	(0.223)	(0.062)	(0.067)	(0.065)	(0.064)	(0.066)
T3: Co-ethnic is not violent, other candidate is rumoured violent	0.148	0.166	0.147	0.118	0.204	-0.017	-0.116***	-0.016	-0.070	-0.040
	(0.106)	(0.227)	(0.102)	(0.129)	(0.152)	(0.049)	(0.035)	(0.050)	(0.045)	(0.057)
T4: Co-ethnic rumoured used violence but good performance. The other candidate is not violent, no cue on performance	0.169	0.119	0.201	0.150	0.236	0.019	-0.003	0.009	-0.021	0.030
	(0.142)	(0.184)	(0.183)	(0.178)	(0.201)	(0.056)	(0.055)	(0.053)	(0.051)	(0.063)
T5: Co-ethnic is not violent, no cue on performance. The other candidate is rumoured violent but good performance	-0.082		-0.074		-0.005	-0.084*	-0.081	-0.086*	-0.080	-0.087
	(0.072)		(0.085)		(0.143)	(0.050)	(0.056)	(0.052)	(0.052)	(0.055)
T6: Both candidates rumoured used violence, no mention on performance on either of them	0.053	-0.009	0.076	0.089	0.037	0.141**	0.152**	0.155**	0.148**	0.161**
	(0.083)	(0.131)	(0.101)	(0.130)	(0.081)	(0.060)	(0.063)	(0.062)	(0.064)	(0.061)
T7:Co-ethnic rumoured used violence but good performance. The other candidate rumoured used violence,no cue on performance	0.066	0.022	0.088	0.082	0.082	0.115	0.150*	0.121	0.109	0.156*
	(0.125)	(0.176)	(0.151)	(0.164)	(0.162)	(0.077)	(0.087)	(0.077)	(0.076)	(0.080)
T8: Co-ethnic rumoured used violence,no cue on performance. The other candidate rumoured used violence, but good performance	0.112		0.189	0.082	0.167	0.115	0.123	0.119	0.100	0.144
	(0.129)		(0.144)	(0.182)	(0.189)	(0.085)	(0.086)	(0.086)	(0.081)	(0.094)
T9: Both candidates rumoured used violence and both were good performers	0.100	-0.000	0.157	0.068	0.155	0.003	0.057	0.007	0.042	0.014
	(0.121)	(0.163)	(0.159)	(0.134)	(0.189)	(0.074)	(0.096)	(0.078)	(0.087)	(0.085)
Pseudo R2	0.043	0.036	0.051	0.021	0.044	0.038	0.067	0.041	0.050	0.050
Observations	368	84	270	166	181	736	536	708	603	639

*Significance Level * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.001. Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at constituency level. -Predicts success perfectly.*

Appendix A

TABLE A.1 Characteristics of Respondents

Characteristics	Percent
Aged 18-26	32.9
Victim of electoral violence	20.2
Female	47.8
Ethnicity	
Kikuyu	17.0
Luo	15.1
Luhya	14.7
Kamba	10.2
Embu/Meru	9.2
Kissi	7.5
Kalenjin	10.2
Mijikenda	6.1
Somali	3.4
Others	6.6
Province	
Nairobi	7.2
Central	8.6
Eastern	16.2
Rift Valley	24.0
Nyanza	15.1
Western	12.7
North Eastern	3.2
Coast	13.0
Rural	57.9
Observations	1210

Source: Authors' survey

TABLE A.2 Percentage of Ethnic Groups Randomly Assigned to Each Treatment in Second Vignette

>Treatment chosen:	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Kikuyu	12.8	6.4	8.8	17.7	13.2	12.8	10.8	7.8	6.9
Luo	14.4	13.8	7.7	11.1	13.8	8.3	11.1	3.3	10.5
Luhya	19.2	6.2	12.4	18.6	10.2	8.5	11.9	7.3	1.7
Kamba	17.1	9.8	13.0	11.4	15.5	8.9	11.4	6.5	3.3
Embu/Meru	2.7	11.7	9.0	23.4	13.5	11.7	12.6	9.0	4.5
Kissi	16.7	11.1	12.2	10.0	16.7	6.7	11.1	5.6	6.7
Kalenjin	7.4	9.0	8.2	18.9	10.7	12.3	12.3	8.2	10.7
Mijikenda	4.1	11.0	12.3	13.7	15.1	19.2	9.6	4.1	4.1
Somali	14.6	7.3	2.4	9.8	14.6	19.5	9.8	14.6	0.0
Others	20.3	7.6	5.1	11.4	13.9	10.1	8.9	5.1	7.6
Average	13.2	9.3	9.6	15.3	13.3	10.9	11.2	6.7	6.1

Source: Authors' survey

TABLE A.3 Respondents' Votes in Imaginary Local Election in Second Vignette by Treatment

	Treatment 1		Treatment 2		Treatment 3		Treatment 4		Treatment 5		Treatment 6		Treatment 7		Treatment 8		Treatment 9	
Candidate:	Kikuyu	Luo	Kikuyu	Luo	Kikuyu	Luo	Kikuyu	Luo	Kikuyu	Luo	Kikuyu	Luo	Kikuyu	Luo	Kikuyu	Luo	Kikuyu	Luo
Kikuyu	69.2	7.7	58.3	16.7	41.2	47.1	66.7	5.6	77.8	11.1	57.7	23.1	90.5	9.5	46.7	20.0	64.3	14.3
Luo	3.9	80.8	16.0	40.0	21.4	57.1	21.1	26.3	8.3	29.2	28.6	21.4	15.0	30.0	0.0	40.0	0.0	72.2
Luhya	31.3	62.5	18.2	63.6	27.3	72.7	33.3	48.5	35.3	41.2	21.4	35.7	55.0	35.0	33.3	41.7	33.3	33.3
Kamba	28.6	61.9	8.3	91.7	18.8	56.3	42.9	42.9	26.3	36.8	27.3	36.4	64.3	35.7	12.5	50.0	0.0	100.0
Embu/Mer	33.3	66.7	7.7	15.4	30.0	10.0	38.5	3.9	73.3	13.3	46.2	7.7	64.3	7.1	10.0	30.0	80.0	20.0
Kissi	28.6	64.3	10.0	90.0	18.2	81.8	55.6	33.3	33.3	33.3	33.3	33.3	30.0	60.0	20.0	60.0	16.7	66.7
Kalenjin	37.5	50.0	18.2	72.7	22.2	77.8	54.6	31.8	33.3	50.0	53.3	40.0	66.7	33.3	40.0	40.0	46.2	38.5
Mijikenda	0.0	66.7	12.5	75.0	11.1	88.9	20.0	30.0	0.0	72.7	0.0	64.3	28.6	42.9	33.3	33.3	66.7	33.3
Somali	50.0	50.0	100.0	0.0	100.0	0.0	66.7	33.3	60.0	20.0	37.5	62.5	66.7	33.3	20.0	80.0		
Others	53.9	46.2	33.3	50.0	0.0	100.0	66.7	22.2	22.2	55.6	50.0	37.5	50.0	33.3	33.3	66.7	40.0	40.0
Average	34.9	54.0	20.9	52.7	24.8	62.0	45.3	25.4	38.3	33.1	37.2	34.1	54.6	29.2	27.6	40.8	35.2	46.5

Source: Authors' survey

TABLE A.4 Percentage of Population Assigned to both VignettesS

		Vignette 2								
	Vignette 1	Treatment 1	Treatment 2	Treatment 3	Treatment 4	Treatment 5	Treatment 6	Treatment 7	Treatment 8	Treatment 9
Voted for Kamau (Kikuyu candidate)	44.8	34.4	20.9	24.4	45.6	38.3	37.2	54.6	28.2	35.2
Voted for Onyango (Luo candidate)	36.2	54.6	52.7	61.7	25.3	33.1	34.1	29.2	39.7	46.5
Voted for both candidates in ballot	0.9	1.3	1.8	1.7	0.6	0.7	1.6	1.5	1.3	2.8
Left ballot in blank	4.0	3.3	5.5	4.4	5.5	14.3	8.5	3.9	12.8	7.0
Refused to vote, said was indifferent between both candidates	6.1	3.9	14.6	4.4	10.4	9.1	10.9	5.4	12.8	4.2
Refused to vote without giving any reason	8.0	2.6	4.6	3.5	12.6	4.6	7.8	5.4	5.1	4.2
Number of observations	1210	154	110	115	182	154	129	130	78	71

Source: Authors' survey

TABLE A.5 Heckit Marginal Effects of Table 4. Respondents Voting for their Preferred Co-ethnic Candidate in First Ballot

Dependent variable> Equal 1 if voted for preferred co-ethnic candidate in ballot 1. Equal 0 if voted for non-preferred

Sample>	Kikuyu/Luo only		Ethnic allies only (Meru,embu,kalenjin / luhya, kissi, kamba, massai, mijikenda, taita, turkana)
	Heckit	Heckit	Heckit
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Luo (Kikuyu reference group)	0.032	-0.039	
	(0.067)	(0.047)	
Luhya			0.043
			(0.321)
Kamba			0.085
			(0.314)
Meru			-0.065
			(0.277)
Kisii			-0.052
			(0.304)
Kalenjin			-0.076
			(0.316)
Maasai			-0.314
			(0.329)
Mijikenda			0.079
			(0.302)
Taita			-0.099
			(0.281)
Turkana			-0.221
			(0.331)
Food Deprivation		0.063	0.060
		(0.043)	(0.043)
Secondary school or more		-0.048	0.014
		(0.060)	(0.044)
Female		-0.010	-0.000
		(0.032)	(0.037)
Rural		0.072**	-0.074
		(0.032)	(0.047)
Victim of electoral violence		-0.021	0.066
		(0.035)	(0.051)
District ethnic fragmentation index		0.131	-0.425**
		(0.150)	(0.148)
District ethnic polarization index		0.207	0.244
		(0.195)	(0.161)
Interested in 2013 presidential elections		0.012	-0.005
		(0.035)	(0.055)
Associational membership		0.019	0.027
		(0.032)	(0.041)
Feels close to a political party		-0.015	0.043
		(0.022)	(0.039)
Province fixed effects	No	Yes	Yes
λ	0.135	-1.00***	0.817
	(1.880)	(0.00)	(0.265)
Observations	380	360	642

*Notes: Significance Level * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.001. Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at constituency level. Controls used in heckman selection model: respondent's ethnicity, gender, food deprivation (poverty), whether had been victim of violence, residing in a rural area, fragmentation and polarization index of district where respondent lives, province fixed effects. Excluded instruments: interviewer's randomly assigned identification number, years of experience and mother tongue.*

Table A.6 Heckit Marginal Effects of Table 5. Probability of Respondents Voting for their Preferred Co-ethnic Candidate in Second Ballot

Dependent variable> Equal 1 if voted for preferred co-ethnic candidate in ballot 2. Equal 0 if voted for non-preferred co-ethnic in ballot 2.

Sample>	Kikuyu/Luo only					Ethnic allies only (Meru,embu,kalenjin / luhya, kissi,				
	All Heckit (1)	Victims of violence Heckit (2)	Non-victims of violence Heckit (3)	Food deprived Heckit (4)	Non-food deprived Heckit (5)	All Heckit (6)	Victims of violence Heckit (7)	Non-victims of violence Heckit (8)	Food deprived Heckit (9)	Non-food deprived Heckit (10)
Treatment 1: Reference group neither candidate had a cue on performance or violence										
T2: Co-ethnic candidate rumoured violent, the other candidate no rumor on violence	-0.264*	-0.679***	-0.204**	-0.177*	-0.416***	-0.171**	-0.011	-0.218**	-0.078	-0.120
	(0.141)	(0.044)	(0.102)	(0.096)	(0.010)	(0.074)	(0.167)	(0.081)	(0.086)	(0.076)
T3: Co-ethnic is not violent, other candidate is rumoured violent	-0.101	-0.106***	-0.050	-0.039	-0.274***	0.168*	0.298	0.143	0.218**	0.163*
	(0.102)	(0.007)	(0.086)	(0.092)	(0.006)	(0.090)	(0.214)	(0.101)	(0.087)	(0.084)
T4: Co-ethnic rumoured used violence but good performance. The other candidate is not violent, no cue on performance	-0.321**	-0.386***	-0.256***	-0.075	-0.684***	-0.184**	-0.186	-0.186**	-0.101	-0.125*
	(0.119)	(0.025)	(0.066)	(0.110)	(0.089)	(0.067)	(0.162)	(0.089)	(0.070)	(0.072)
T5: Co-ethnic is not violent, no cue on performance. The other candidate is rumoured violent but good performance	-0.118	-0.157***	-0.108	-0.061	-0.180***	0.153**	0.065	0.174**	0.172**	0.132*
	(0.106)	(0.010)	(0.098)	(0.102)	(0.004)	(0.072)	(0.160)	(0.084)	(0.077)	(0.069)
T6: Both candidates rumoured used violence, no mention on performance on either of them	-0.106	-0.089	-0.083	20.535***	-0.306**	0.002	-0.011	0.006	0.093***	0.075***
	(0.099)	(0.179)	(0.095)	(3.947)	(0.097)	(0.079)	(0.126)	(0.093)	(0.003)	(0.003)
T7:Co-ethnic rumoured used violence but good performance. The other candidate rumoured used violence,no cue on performance	-0.207*	-0.196***	-0.162*	1.035**	-0.388***	0.009	0.065	-0.002	0.050	0.049
	(0.110)	(0.013)	(0.090)	(0.388)	(0.100)	(0.087)	(0.337)	(0.100)	(0.091)	(0.085)
T8: Co-ethnic rumoured used violence,no cue on performance. The other candidate rumoured used violence, but good performance	-0.305**	-0.572**	-0.152	-0.195	-0.541***	-0.041	0.091	-0.086	0.074***	-0.001***
	(0.135)	(0.198)	(0.093)	(0.125)	(0.102)	(0.088)	(0.134)	(0.111)	(0.002)	(0.000)
T9: Both candidates rumoured used violence and both were good performers	-0.018	-0.070***	-0.004	-0.009	-0.322***	0.006	0.000	0.004	-0.048	-0.074
	(0.124)	(0.005)	(0.123)	(0.120)	(0.007)	(0.081)	(0.213)	(0.095)	(0.100)	(0.095)
λ	-0.130	1.00	-1.00	-0.34	1.00	0.42	1.00	0.43	-1.00***	-1.00***
	(0.632)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.327)	(0.00)	(0.242)	(0.000)	(0.263)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Observations	363	97	266	183	181	635	110	525	303	356

*Notes: Significance Level * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.001. Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at constituency level.*

Controls used in heckman selection model: respondent's ethnicity, gender, food deprivation (poverty), whether had been victim of violence, residing in a rural area, fragmentation and polarization index of district where respondent lives, province fixed effects. Excluded instruments: interviewer's randomly assigned identification number, years of experience and mother tongue.

Table A.7 Marginal Effects of Violence and Performance Cues on Probability of Respondents Voting for their Preferred Co-ethnic Candidate in Second Ballot

Dependent variable> Equal 1 if voted for preferred co-ethnic candidate in ballot 2. Equal 0 if voted for non-preferred co-ethnic in ballot 2.

Sample>	Kikuyu/Luo only						Ethnic allies only (Meru,embu,kalenjin / luhya, kissi, kamba, massai, mijikenda, taita, turkana)					
	All	Associational membership	Interested in elections	Secondary school or more	High ethnic fragmentation index	High ethnic polarization index	All	Associational membership	Interested in elections	Secondary school or more	High ethnic fragmentation index	High ethnic polarization index
	Probit	Probit	Probit	Probit	Probit	Probit	Probit	Probit	Probit	Probit	Probit	Probit
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Treatment 1: Reference group neither candidate had a cue on performance or violence												
T2: Co-ethnic candidate rumoured violent, the other candidate no rumor on violence	-0.357**	-	-0.979***	-0.408**	-0.194	-0.275	-0.177**	-0.159	-0.330***	-0.234**	0.026	0.032
	(0.161)		(0.008)	(0.167)	(0.202)	(0.197)	(0.083)	(0.129)	(0.081)	(0.099)	(0.098)	(0.099)
T3: Co-ethnic is not violent, other candidate is rumoured violent	-0.127	-0.229	-0.979***	-0.092	-0.086	-0.062	0.176**	0.233**	0.139	0.130	0.212*	0.240**
	(0.113)	(0.221)	(0.020)	(0.117)	(0.130)	(0.119)	(0.076)	(0.094)	(0.094)	(0.099)	(0.113)	(0.117)
T4: Co-ethnic rumoured used violence but good performance. The other candidate is not violent, no cue on performance	-0.476***	-0.284	-0.988***	-0.412**	-0.547***	-0.533***	-0.192**	-0.259**	-0.281***	-0.212**	-0.110	-0.118
	(0.129)	(0.192)	(0.006)	(0.142)	(0.139)	(0.137)	(0.074)	(0.117)	(0.080)	(0.089)	(0.116)	(0.130)
T5: Co-ethnic is not violent, no cue on performance. The other candidate is rumoured violent but good performance	-0.137	-0.189	-0.986***	-0.087	-0.140	-0.085	0.156**	0.096	0.072	0.162**	0.285***	0.318***
	(0.144)	(0.206)	(0.012)	(0.145)	(0.173)	(0.155)	(0.064)	(0.110)	(0.081)	(0.081)	(0.076)	(0.077)
T6: Both candidates rumoured used violence, no mention on performance on either of them	-0.130	-0.033	-0.984***	-0.111	-0.175	-0.103	0.013	0.046	-0.108	-0.097	-0.041	0.000
	(0.127)	(0.146)	(0.012)	(0.132)	(0.174)	(0.150)	(0.080)	(0.131)	(0.093)	(0.116)	(0.126)	(0.137)
T7:Co-ethnic rumoured used violence but good performance. The other candidate rumoured used violence,no cue on performance	-0.273*		-0.985***	-0.281*	-0.265	-0.174	0.028	-0.060	-0.059	0.066	0.132	0.155
	(0.157)		(0.007)	(0.163)	(0.181)	(0.167)	(0.090)	(0.142)	(0.112)	(0.110)	(0.131)	(0.124)
T8: Co-ethnic rumoured used violence,no cue on performance. The other candidate rumoured used violence, but good performance	-0.437**	-0.570**	-0.986***	-0.321*	-0.411**	-0.370**	-0.035	-0.089	-0.086	-0.115	0.132	0.155
	(0.168)	(0.263)	(0.007)	(0.177)	(0.181)	(0.188)	(0.094)	(0.151)	(0.098)	(0.107)	(0.101)	(0.109)
T9: Both candidates rumoured used violence and both were good performers	-0.022	-0.153	-0.973***	-0.002	0.097	-0.023	0.016	0.077	-0.008	0.048	-0.026	-0.071
	(0.136)	(0.222)	(0.003)	(0.136)	(0.131)	(0.159)	(0.085)	(0.132)	(0.100)	(0.111)	(0.119)	(0.136)
Pseudo R2	0.094	0.136	0.186	0.086	0.119	0.109	0.051	0.062	0.072	0.064	0.059	0.072
Observations	253	96	194	213	178	187	573	271	437	408	297	264

*Notes: Significance Level * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.001. Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at constituency level.*
-Predicts success perfectly.

Table A.8 Heckit Marginal Effects of Table A.7 of Respondents Voting for their Preferred Co-ethnic Candidate in Second Ballot

Dependent variable> Equal 1 if voted for preferred co-ethnic candidate in ballot 2. Equal 0 if voted for non-preferred co-ethnic in ballot 2.

Sample>	Kikuyu/Luo only						Ethnic allies only (Meru,embu,kalenjin / luhya, kissi, kamba, massai, mijikenda, taita, turkana)					
	All	Associational membership	Interested in elections	Secondary school or more	High ethnic fragmentation index	High ethnic polarization index	All	Associational membership	Interested in elections	Secondary school or more	High ethnic fragmentation index	High ethnic polarization index
	Heckit (1)	Heckit (2)	Heckit (3)	Heckit (4)	Heckit (5)	Heckit (6)	Heckit (7)	Heckit (8)	Heckit (9)	Heckit (10)	Heckit (11)	Heckit (12)
Treatment 1: Reference group neither candidate had a cue on performance or violence												
T2: Co-ethnic candidate rumoured violent, the other candidate no rumor on violence	-0.265*	0.782***	-1.203***	-0.311**	-0.098	-0.155	-0.171**	-0.168**	-0.308***	-0.225**	0.025	0.030
	(0.141)	(0.181)	(0.323)	(0.153)	(0.126)	(0.099)	(0.074)	(0.077)	(0.071)	(0.090)	(0.094)	(0.094)
T3: Co-ethnic is not violent, other candidate is rumoured violent	-0.071	-0.192	-0.948***	-0.038	-0.008	0.007	0.168*	0.172*	0.116	0.107	0.221*	0.251*
	(0.102)	(0.185)	(0.239)	(0.106)	(0.090)	(0.078)	(0.090)	(0.096)	(0.099)	(0.108)	(0.133)	(0.145)
T4: Co-ethnic rumoured used violence but good performance. The other candidate is not violent, no cue on performance	-0.332**	-0.217	-1.296***	-0.289**	-0.309**	-0.268***	-0.184**	-0.240***	-0.262***	-0.202**	-0.102	-0.107
	(0.131)	(0.154)	(0.305)	(0.144)	(0.138)	(0.063)	(0.067)	(0.071)	(0.071)	(0.081)	(0.105)	(0.117)
T5: Co-ethnic is not violent, no cue on performance. The other candidate is rumoured violent but good performance	-0.082	-0.058	-1.023***	-0.078	-0.078	-0.086	0.153**	0.063***	0.065	0.153*	0.315**	0.354***
	(0.115)	(0.139)	(0.235)	(0.123)	(0.129)	(0.106)	(0.072)	(0.002)	(0.080)	(0.089)	(0.099)	(0.103)
T6: Both candidates rumoured used violence, no mention on performance on either of them	-0.103	-0.032	-1.037***	-0.091	-0.110	-0.077	0.002	0.038	-0.109	-0.105	-0.038	0.000
	(0.102)	(0.130)	(0.272)	(0.112)	(0.103)	(0.090)	(0.079)	(0.094)	(0.085)	(0.109)	(0.118)	(0.127)
T7:Co-ethnic rumoured used violence but good performance. The other candidate rumoured used violence,no cue on performance	-0.146	2.963**	-1.098***	-0.154	-0.108	-0.085	0.009	-0.108***	-0.084	0.041	0.133	0.155
	(0.127)	(1.098)	(0.262)	(0.131)	(0.133)	(0.119)	(0.087)	(0.003)	(0.102)	(0.110)	(0.142)	(0.164)
T8: Co-ethnic rumoured used violence,no cue on performance. The other candidate rumoured used violence, but good performance	-0.304**	-0.369	-1.209***	-0.229	-0.194	-0.158**	-0.041	-0.094	-0.086	-0.121	0.133	0.155
	(0.143)	(0.229)	(0.297)	(0.141)	(0.135)	(0.065)	(0.088)	(0.102)	(0.086)	(0.097)	(0.106)	(0.123)
T9: Both candidates rumoured used violence and both were good performers	0.013	-0.148	-1.015***	0.029	1.588***	0.027	0.006	0.029	-0.025	0.036	-0.023	-0.065
	(0.148)	(0.148)	(0.261)	(0.154)	(0.209)	(0.134)	(0.081)	(0.143)	(0.090)	(0.110)	(0.118)	(0.128)
λ	0.01	0.47	-0.18	-0.01	-0.57	-1.00	0.42	-1.00	0.521*	0.37	-0.02	1.00
	(0.714)	(0.852)	(0.704)	(0.726)	(0.937)	(0.000)	(0.242)	(0.000)	(0.237)	(0.250)	(1.050)	(0.000)
Observations	363	173	276	299	225	247	635	293	491	463	308	274

*Notes: Significance Level * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.001. Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at constituency level.*

-Predicts success perfectly. Controls used in heckman selection model: respondent's ethnicity, gender, food deprivation (poverty), whether had been victim of violence, residing in a rural area, fragmentation and polarization index of district where respondent lives, province fixed effects. Excluded instruments: interviewer's randomly assigned identification number, years of experience and mother tongue.

Table A.9 Heckit Marginal Effects of Table 6. Probability of Respondents Voting for their Preferred Co-ethnic Candidate in Third Ballot

Dependent variable> Equal 1 if voted for preferred co-ethnic candidate in 2nd and 3rd Ballot. Equal 0 if voted for preferred co-ethnic candidate in 2nd ballot but in 3rd ballot claimed would not vote for preferred co-ethnic candidate.

Sample>	Kikuyu/Luo only					Ethnic allies only (Meru,embu,kalenjin / luhya, kissi,				
	All Heckit (1)	Victims of violence Heckit (2)	Non-victims of violence Heckit (3)	Food deprived Heckit (4)	Non-food deprived Heckit (5)	All Heckit (6)	Victims of violence Heckit (7)	Non-victims of violence Heckit (8)	Food deprived Heckit (9)	Non-food deprived Heckit (10)
Treatment 1: Reference group co-ethnic rumoured corrupt. Neither candidate with other cues on performance or violence.										
T2: Co-ethnic candidate rumored violent and corrupt, the other candidate no rumor on violence	0.131	-1.414**	0.202	0.137	0.177***	0.156**	0.244**	0.125	0.213***	0.143
	(0.264)	(0.482)	(0.141)	(0.125)	(0.006)	(0.062)	(0.099)	(0.096)	(0.009)	(0.121)
T3: Co-ethnic is not violent but is rumored corrupt, other candidate is rumoured violent	0.065	-0.151	0.215***	0.047***	0.125***	0.150**	0.070	0.147**	0.338***	0.016
	(0.160)	(0.130)	(0.033)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.062)	(0.156)	(0.068)	(0.073)	(0.108)
T4: Co-ethnic is rumored violent and corrupt, but has good performance. The other candidate is not violent, no cue on performance	-0.064	-0.020	0.080**	-0.072***	0.234	0.080	0.221	0.047	0.238***	-0.028
	(0.256)	(0.151)	(0.031)	(0.004)	(0.222)	(0.090)	(0.201)	(0.098)	(0.010)	(0.137)
T5: Co-ethnic is not violent but is rumored corrupt, no cue on performance. The other candidate is rumored violent but good performance	0.257**	-3.12e+04**	0.212**	0.279**	0.181*	0.269***	0.353***	0.249**	0.325***	0.254**
	(0.112)	(10629.884)	(0.094)	(0.096)	(0.105)	(0.060)	(0.033)	(0.081)	(0.070)	(0.077)
T6: Both candidates rumored used violence, but co-ethnic candidate rumored corrupt. No mention on performance on either of them	0.121	0.012	0.146***	0.007	0.202*	0.056	0.233***	0.015	0.106***	0.067
	(0.143)	(0.168)	(0.032)	(0.075)	(0.115)	(0.080)	(0.022)	(0.087)	(0.005)	(0.104)
T7:Co-ethnic rumored used violence, is corrupt, but good performance. The other candidate rumored used violence,no cue on performance	0.115	-23.295**	0.276**	0.121***	0.186***	0.118	0.406***	0.075	0.247**	0.025
	(0.189)	(7.948)	(0.096)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.096)	(0.037)	(0.102)	(0.087)	(0.140)
T8: Co-ethnic rumored used violence and is corrupt,no cue on performance. The other candidate rumored used violence, but good performance	-1.957***	-1.309**	-0.514***	-1.369***	-1.811***	0.029	0.071	0.015	0.146	0.039
	(0.177)	(0.532)	(0.015)	(0.079)	(0.129)	(0.065)	(0.159)	(0.071)	(0.093)	(0.166)
T9: Both candidates rumored used violence and both were good performers. But co-ethnic candidate rumored corrupt.	0.068	-1.331**	0.120***	-0.010***	0.166	0.175*	0.523**	0.127	0.372**	0.069
	(0.168)	(0.454)	(0.032)	(0.001)	(0.105)	(0.105)	(0.190)	(0.117)	(0.144)	(0.155)
λ	-0.016	-0.01	-1.00	1.00	-1.00***	1.00***	1.00***	1.00	1.00	1.00
	(1.069)	(1.180)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Observations	318	85	233	169	150	536	86	450	262	274

*Notes: Significance Level * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.001. Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at constituency level.*

-Predicts success perfectly. Controls used in heckman selection model: respondent's ethnicity, gender, food deprivation (poverty), whether had been victim of violence, residing in a rural area, fragmentation and polarization index of district where respondent lives, province fixed effects. Excluded instruments: interviewer's randomly assigned identification number, years of experience and mother tongue.

FIGURE A.1 Believe Politics is a Dirty Business, if Candidates Want to Win, They Need to Intimidate Opponents and Hire Gangs.



Source: Authors' survey

FIGURE A.2 Believe some Politicians Spread Rumors that their Opponents used Violence, just to Eliminate them from Competition



Source: Authors' survey

Appendix B

First Vignette

We are now going to play an elections game.

Imagine for a moment that there is a vacancy in your constituency for a Member of Parliament. So there will be a by-election held in a few weeks time. Only two candidates will be competing for the MP seat in your constituency.

Imagine that both candidates have equal experience in politics, both have been elected MPs before, but in other constituencies similar to this one during the 2008-2013 administration. They did not contend in the 2013 elections in the constituencies they used to be MPs due to the administrative changes of boundaries that some areas had. Both candidates are promising to improve the economy of your community. They are:

Candidate 1 is John Onyango, and he is running on the ODM party.
Candidate 2 is John Kamau, and he is running on the TNA party.

1.A **Remembering that they will be the only candidates contending in this imaginary election, I am going to ask you to secretly cast your vote in this ballot for the person you would vote for between these two candidates.**

Your vote will be placed in this bag mixed with other ballots. Your vote is private, we will respect your confidentiality and no-one will identify your name with your vote.

A	Refused to vote, respondent said was indifferent between candidates ***>Go to Q1.B***	5
B	Refused to vote without giving any reason ***>Go to Q1.B***	6
	OPTIONS C, D, E, F WILL BE FILLED BY ENUMERATOR´S SUPERVISOR	
C	Respondent voted for Candidate 1, John Onyango in the ballot.	1
D	Respondent voted for Candidate 2, John Kamau in the ballot.	2
E	Respondent voted for both candidates in the ballot .	3
F	Respondent did not vote for either of candidates, left voting ballot in blank.	4

Second Vignette

1.B **Now I'm going to tell you a little bit more about these candidates. But first I would like you to pick any number between one and nine.**

1	Neither John Onyango nor John Kamau has ever used violence to try winning elections.

2	John Onyango has never used violence to try winning elections. John Kamau is rumoured to have ordered one murder and hired gangs during the 2007 elections. He has not been arrested for these alleged crimes.

3	John Kamau is rumoured to have ordered one murder and hired gangs during the 2007 elections. He has not been arrested for these alleged crimes. Back when John Kamau was an elected MP, he was among the few MPs that were randomly and independently audited about how MPs used the CDF fund, the fund that MPs are given to reduce poverty in their constituencies. The audit found that Kamau spent the CDF fund for its intended purpose, to tackle poverty, and used it for good quality projects. John Onyango has never used violence to try winning elections. We do not have any information about how Onyango used the CDF back when he was an elected MP because he, like the majority of other MPs, was not audited.

4	John Onyango is rumoured to have ordered one murder and hired gangs in the 2007 elections. He has not been arrested for these alleged crimes. John Kamau has never used violence to try winning elections.

5	Both John Onyango and John Kamau are rumoured to have ordered one murder and hired gangs during the 2007 elections. They have not been arrested for these alleged crimes.

6	John Kamau is rumoured to have ordered one murder and hired gangs during the 2007 elections. He has not been arrested for these alleged crimes. Back when John Kamau was an elected MP, he was among the few MPs that were randomly and independently audited about how MPs used the CDF fund, the fund that MPs are given to reduce poverty in their constituencies. The audit found that Kamau spent the CDF fund for its intended purpose, to tackle poverty, and used it for good quality projects. John Onyango is rumoured to have ordered one murder and hired gangs in the 2007 elections. He has not been arrested for these alleged crimes. We do not have any information about how Onyango used the CDF, back when he was an elected MP because he, like the majority of other MPs, was not audited.

7	John Onyango is rumoured to have ordered one murder and hired gangs during the 2007 elections. He has not been arrested for these alleged crimes. Back when John Onyango was an elected MP, he was among the few MPs that were randomly and independently audited about how MPs used the CDF fund, the fund that MPs are given to reduce poverty in their constituencies. The audit found that Onyango spent the CDF fund for its intended purpose, to tackle poverty, and used it for good quality projects. John Kamau has never used violence to try winning elections. We do not have any information about how Kamau used the CDF back when he was an elected MP because he, as the majority of other MPs, was not audited.

8	John Onyango is rumoured to have ordered one murder and hired gangs during the 2007 elections. He has not been arrested for these alleged crimes. Back when John Onyango was an elected MP, he was among the few MPs that were randomly and independently audited about how MPs used the CDF fund, the fund that MPs are given to reduce poverty in their constituencies. The audit found that Onyango spent the CDF fund for its intended purpose, to tackle poverty, and used it for good quality projects. John Kamau is also rumoured to have ordered one murder and hired gangs in the 2007 elections. He has not been arrested either for these alleged crimes. We do not have any information about how Kamau used the CDF back when he was an elected MP because he, like the majority of other MPs, was not audited.

9	John Onyango and John Kamau are both rumoured to have ordered one murder and to have both hired gangs in the 2007 elections. They have not been arrested for these alleged crimes. Back when Onyango and Kamau were elected MPs, both of them were among the few MPs that got randomly and independently audited about how they managed their CDF funds, the fund that MPs are given to reduce poverty in their constituencies. The audits found they both spent the CDF fund for its intended purpose, to tackle poverty, and used it for good quality projects.

2. With this new information, I am going to ask you to secretly cast your vote in this ballot again for your preferred candidate between these two. Again, your vote will be placed in this bag and be mixed with other ballots. Your vote is private, we will respect your confidentiality and no-one will identify your name with your vote. As before you can tick in this ballot for your preferred candidate between these two.

A	Refused to vote, respondent said was indifferent between candidates***>GO TO Q3***	5
B	Refused to vote without giving any reason ***>GO TO Q3***	6
	OPTIONS C, D, E, F WILL BE FILLED BY ENUMERATOR´S SUPERVISOR	
C	Respondent voted for Candidate 1, John Onyango in the ballot.	1
D	Respondent voted for Candidate 2, John Kamau in the ballot.	2
E	Respondent voted for both candidates in the ballot .	3
F	Respondent did not vote for either of candidates, left voting ballot in blank.	4

3. If your most preferred candidate between these two was rumoured to have abused his political position and having a lifestyle that was better than he could afford on his honestly earned income. Would you be more or less likely to vote for him?

Less likely	Unchanged	More likely	I would not vote for him [**DO NOT READ**]	Don't know	RTA
1	2	3	4	9	99

We have finished playing the game.

Appendix C: Voting ballot design

Identical ballots were used for both the first and the second votes.

VOTE FOR ONE CANDIDATE ONLY 

Candidate: John Onyango ORANGE DEMOCRATIC MOVEMENT (ODM)	Tick here if vote for this candidate
	
Candidate: John Kamau The National Alliance (TNA)	Tick here if vote for this candidate
	

Once you finish voting, please fold the voting ballot and place it in the bag provided by the interviewer. Thank you.

Q1 Survey KEN				

Once you finish voting, please fold the voting ballot and place it in the bag provided by the interviewer. Thank you.